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INTRODUCTION

Statutes that contain both civil remedies and criminal penalties
are typical in the modern regulatory state. Among them are RICO,'
the antitrust laws, 2 the securities laws,3 environmental laws such
as the Clean Water Act,4 various tax statutes,5 the Copyright Act,6
and the Bankruptcy Code.7 These statutes most often regulate
business affairs and provide for criminal penalties to punish willful
violators. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,8 the statute enacted in
response to the financial scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other
major corporations, provides a recent example of this remedial
scheme, which remains popular with lawmakers.
This Article argues that the standard array of interpretive tools
employed by judges and academics does not adequately account for
important irregularities in the ways that courts construe these
dual-remedy statutes, especially in criminal cases. Most of the
literature focuses on two institutions: the legislature and the courts.
To the extent that administrative agencies become part of the mix,
the main issue addressed is how much deference courts should give
to the interpretation of a statute by the agency that has been
charged with enforcing it. This Article, in contrast, suggests that
the institutional setting in which a statute is enforced has a
profound effect on how courts construe the statute over time.
Although deference doctrines play a role, judicial decisions also
reflect the resources committed to litigation by governmental
institutions in civil and criminal cases.
Even on the surface, this kind of legislative scheme creates
complex interpretive problems. Deeply entrenched in our system of
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000) (criminal); id. § 1964 (civil).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000) (criminal); id. § 15 (civil).
3. Id. §§ 77e, 77q (civil); id. § 78if(a) (criminal).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2000) (criminal); id. § 1319(b) (civil).

5. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5871 (2000) (indicating the prohibited acts and criminal
penalties for firearm tax evasion); id. § 5849 (civil) (taxing certain firearms); see also id. §
7201 (criminalizing tax evasion).

6. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000) (criminal and civil).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 152-157 (2000) (criminal); 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000) (civil).
8. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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statutory jurisprudence are two complementary canons of
construction: Remedial statutes are interpreted liberally; penal
statutes are interpreted narrowly.9 The former reflects concern
about public health and welfare, the latter the due process rights of
those accused of committing crimes. Should courts interpret these
dual-remedy statutes narrowly in criminal cases, but broadly in
civil cases, thus creating two different readings of each statute?
Should they interpret the statute narrowly in both kinds of cases
to be fair to criminal defendants without creating multiple interpretations of the same language? Should they interpret the
statute broadly in both criminal and civil cases, forsaking the value
of lenity in order to promote both uniformity and aggressive
regulation in civil cases? Should they sometimes interpret a statute
broadly in criminal cases but narrowly in civil cases, perhaps to
limit private litigation when the statute is basically a criminal one?
Each of these possible solutions requires the courts to weigh values
that would be noncontroversial were they not in conflict with one
another. Institutional choices that determine the ways these
statutes are enforced influence the weight that courts ultimately
give in different statutory settings.
Table 1 shows the four interpretive possibilities for dual-remedy
statutes which I have named the standard model, the inflationary
model, the lenity model, and the law enforcement model.
Table 1: The Four Interpretive Approaches to Dual-remedy
Statutes
Model

Remedial

Criminal

Standard

Broad

Narrow

Inflationary

Broad

Broad

Lenity

Narrow

Narrow

Law Enforcement

Narrow

Broad

9. This second canon is the rule of lenity.
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Much of this Article will be devoted to examining the inflationary
model. When courts interpret a statute broadly enough in civil cases
to further its regulatory goals, the broad interpretations sometimes
spill over to criminal cases, causing an increase in criminal liability.
Conduct that was not criminal in the past has become criminal
without any legislative action.'" I call this phenomenon "statutory
inflation."
To illustrate with an example that will be discussed in more
detail later, courts do not generally apply statutes extraterritorially." Yet, for perfectly good reasons, the Supreme Court
held in HartfordFire Insurance Co. v. California,2 that the antitrust statutes should be applied extraterritorially when their
violation has an effect in the United States. 3 If it were otherwise,
companies could legally conspire to gain monopoly power in the
United States simply by meeting abroad. Thus, the decision is
consistent with the notion that remedial statutes are to be
interpreted broadly.
Prior to HartfordFire, it would have been unlikely for a court to
apply United States antitrust laws internationally in a criminal
case. Criminal statutes are generally interpreted narrowly, and
nothing in the antitrust laws says that Congress intended any
exception to the extraterritoriality rule. But once the courts
interpret a statute broadly in a civil case, the ruling becomes part
of the meaning of the statute for subsequent judicial analysis. 4
Over the years, antitrust regulators and the antitrust bar
have absorbed the notion that extraterritorial conspiracies are
10. The legislature is usually thought to be the only governmental institution with power
to define criminal activity. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 105 (1820)
(Marshall, C.J.) ("We can conceive no reason why other crimes, which are not comprehended
in this act, should not be punished. But Congress has not made them punishable, and this
court cannot enlarge the statute.").
11. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 348 (1909).
12. 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993).
13. Id. at 795-96.
14. In this context, Ronald Dworkin's metaphor for statutory interpretation is useful.
Dworkin argues that courts should regard themselves as the author of the next chapter in
a chain novel, in which each chapter is written by a different author. Judges have
considerable discretion as to what they say, but they must write a chapter that is as tightly
woven as possible with what has been said before. See RONALD DWORIUN, LAW's EMPIRE 22838 (1986).
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unacceptable. As a result, the First Circuit recently refused to apply
the rule of lenity in a criminal antitrust case involving extra15
territorial conduct.
Statutory inflation will most likely occur when both an
administrative agency and a division or bureau of the Department
of Justice push for expansive interpretation of a statutory scheme.
One informal, but important device that serves to limit the
expansion of criminal liability is prosecutorial discretion. With
heavy caseloads and the chance of losing a case that rests on
uncertain legal grounds, prosecutors have an incentive to devote
6
most of their resources to clear instances of criminal wrongdoing. 1
That cost-benefit analysis changes when an agency contains an
enforcement division whose only job is to bring civil actions under
either a single statute or a small set of related statutes, and the
Department of Justice has a bureau whose only job is to bring
criminal cases, largely those that the agency refers for prosecution.
Together, they are more likely to pursue more marginal cases, and
to ask courts to interpret the law expansively.
Moreover, when an agency interprets a statute through a formal
process, its . interpretation is ordinarily reviewed deferentially
under the Chevron doctrine, according to which courts defer to the
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute, as long it is
reasonable.17 As a result, agencies are free to promulgate rules that
might be much broader than Congress intended when it delegated
authority to them. Although the application of the Chevron doctrine
is consistent with the broad interpretation of remedial statutes,
if Congress also decides to criminalize the willful violation of
regulations, statutory inflation is likely to occur.' 8

15. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1997).
16. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 444-46 (2001) (arguing that budgetary constraints are not
always successful in curbing abuse from prosecutorial zeal); Robert L. Misner, Recasting
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996) (advocating that
prosecutorial discretion be reviewed and linked to such economic matters as prison
resources).
17. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,865 (1984).
18. See infra Parts I.B.1, I.B.3 (discussing this issue in connection with securities and
environmental statutes).
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Significantly, statutory inflation occurs even when courts believe
that they are applying the standard model. It is by and large an
unnoticed by-product of the architecture of legal institutions empowered to enforce the laws. Beyond that, inflationary pressure is
increased because courts are reluctant to maintain two separate
sets of readings for multiple-remedy statutes: a narrow reading for
criminal cases and a broad reading for civil cases. This reduces the
appeal of the standard model, thereby increasing the need to seek
alternatives.
Although the other two interpretive models-the lenity model
and the law enforcement model-play less prominent roles, they
are both very much alive. The lenity model calls for a statute to
be interpreted narrowly in all cases, in order to protect against
statutory inflation in criminal cases resulting from broad interpretation in civil ones. 9 It can result in underenforcement of
remedial legislation. The Supreme Court has recently used this
model to interpret a statute that taxes certain firearms,2" and to
interpret a statute that governs the conduct of former government
officials after they leave public office. 2 ' Finally, the law enforcement
model calls for broad interpretation of a statute in criminal cases,
but narrow interpretation in civil cases. It is at odds with the
standard model, and on its face inconsistent with basic principles
of statutory interpretation. Yet courts use it occasionally. For
example, courts are sometimes reluctant to give civil RICO
plaintiffs the broad latitude that they give federal prosecutors when
the predicate acts for RICO are multiple mail fraud offenses.2 2
Part I of this Article describes the four models in more detail and
illustrates their application. Although courts' descriptions of their
interpretive decisions seem to suggest that they randomly apply
conflicting canons of statutory construction, this rhetoric masks
important institutional considerations that drive the array of
decisions. The likelihood of statutory inflation is largely a function
of the institutional setting in which the statute is enforced. Thus,
substantial inflation has occurred in the interpretation of antitrust,
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 (1992).
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1989).
See infra Part I.D.1.
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environmental, and securities laws. In contrast, there has been
little inflation in criminal cases interpreting the Copyright Act or
the Bankruptcy Code, which are basically interpreted according to
a weaker version of the standard model. The Bankruptcy Code is
especially interesting because the judiciary is concerned about
underenforcement, and has been moving in recent years to increase
prosecutions for bankruptcy crimes. To the extent that institutions
are created or expanded to carry out this program, statutory
inflation may occur in the future. Use of the other two models is
more idiosyncratic, and reflects judicial attitudes toward particular
statutes.
Part II first asks whether statutory inflation should be controlled.
In some instances, it is the law's way of responding to behavioral
changes over time. At other times, however, statutory inflation in
criminal cases raises serious due process concerns. This is
especially so when legal norms have not yet become firmly rooted
through litigation that resolves disputes over the validity of
administrative rulemaking. In any event, legislatures should be
aware of the interpretive consequences of the enforcement schemes
they enact.
Part II continues by relating the phenomenon of statutory
inflation to dynamic models of statutory interpretation. 3 It then
considers the prospect of controlling statutory inflation by imposing
strong mens rea requirements in criminal cases, legislating rules of
interpretation within the statute itself, or modifying the Chevron
doctrine when applied to rules that are the subject of criminal
sanctions. Legal scholars have debated whether agency rulemaking
should be exempt from the Chevron doctrine in criminal cases. 24 If
23. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). For recent
discussion relating dynamic interpretation to the structure of the administrative state,
consistent with the views taken in this Article, see Edward L. Rubin, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2002): Article 2, at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2003).
24. See, e.g., Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of
Powers in the Post.Chevron Era,32 B.C. L. REV. 757 (1991); Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says
It's a Crime?:Chevron Deference to Agency InterpretationsofRegulatoryStatutes that Create
CriminalLiability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,2097 (1990); Mark D. Alexander, Note, Increased
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it were, courts would use standard methods of statutory interpretation to uphold prosecutions for violation of a regulation only
when the regulation is both permitted under the statute and
actually within the contemplation of the Congress that enacted the
statute. Courts would continue to give Chevron deference in civil
cases involving regulations. This method of dual interpretation
would restore the standard model and undermine the inflationary
model. Whether the Chevron doctrine was a good idea in the first
place, however, courts cannot realistically be expected to hold
the same regulation valid for regulatory purposes, but void for
criminal ones. In fact, the Supreme Court has already rejected that
proposition.2 Nonetheless, I argue that some modification of the
Chevron doctrine in cases involving novel prosecutions for
regulatory crimes is feasible and would help allay concerns about
statutory inflation without adequate democratic process.
Part III relates the findings of this Article to recent literature on
institutional choice,2 6 using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as a
model. That statute introduces new inflationary pressures into the
securities laws, but also contains provisions that tend to reduce
inflation, such as interpretive directives within the statute itself.
The Article concludes that in deciding which institutions are
appropriate for the enforcement of a regulatory scheme, Congress
should keep in mind that the choice of institutions will have
predictable effects on the conduct of the courts as the scheme
matures.

JudicialScrutiny for the Administrative Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 612 (1992).
25. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter ofCmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,704 n. 18
(1995).
26. See, e.g., NEIL K. KoMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS (2001); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant
to FederalCriminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv. 469 (1996); Neil K. Komesar, Exploring the

Darkness:Law, Economics, and InstitutionalChoice, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 465; Spencer Weber
Waller, Prosecutionby Regulation: The ChangingNature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR.

L. REV. 1383 (1998).
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I. FOUR MODELS FOR INTERPRETING STATUTES WITH CIL AND
CRIMINAL REMEDIES

A. The StandardModel
The standard canons of statutory interpretation assume that
remedial and criminal laws are embodied in different statutes.
Remedial statutes are interpreted broadly, criminal statutes
narrowly. Although it is occasionally difficult to determine whether
a statute should be considered penal or remedial,2" these rules have
lived side-by-side for centuries. The standard model calls for courts
to construe dual-remedy statutes in keeping with these default
values. Courts, however, do not impose two separate interpretations
on the same words, depending on whether the case is civil or
criminal. In fact, a recent article by Professor Sachs refers to
unified interpretation of dual-remedy statutes as the "core
principle."2 Yet the system routinely preserves the values of the
standard model when different institutions in government
cooperate in such a way as to simulate its results. To accomplish
this goal, courts frequently interpret a statute liberally in civil
cases, while prosecutors pursue only the clearest and most
egregious violations of the statute for criminal sanctions. Only
occasionally does the issue of lenity arise at all. This Part first
discusses the two principles that underlie the standard model, and
then illustrates the model's application in the prosecution of
copyright and bankruptcy crimes.

27. See, e.g., Chasev. Curtis, 113 U.S. 452,463-64(1885) (holding that a statute imposing
liability on directors for corporate debts under certain circumstances is penal in nature, and
therefore, must be strictly construed).
28. Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal
Regulatory Statutes: The Case of The SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
1025, 1029.
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1. Two Basic Principles
a. Broad Interpretationof Remedial Statutes
Congress did not begin to enact large numbers of regulatory
statutes until the end of the nineteenth century. Yet the rule that
remedial statutes are to be interpreted broadly in order to combat
the evil that the legislature had identified is much older than that.
Blackstone wrote of remedial statutes: "[Ilt is the business of the
judges so to construe the act, as to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy."29
In the United States, the canon was argued in the Supreme Court
as early as 1804,30 and appeared in various state and federal court
decisions throughout the nineteenth century. For example, in 1843,
Justice Story, sitting as circuit justice, applied the canon to hold a
member of a corporation subject to personal liability in a patent
dispute.3 ' A Massachusetts statute imposed personal liability on a
member of a manufacturing corporation "in his individual capacity
for all debts contracted during the time of his continuing a member
of such corporation." 2 The question was whether an unliquidated
claim for patent infringement should count as a "debt contracted"
under the statute.3 Applying the rule governing the interpretation
of remedial statutes, Story held that it should.3 4 He noted that
Massachusetts courts had construed the term broadly. 35 He further
commented:
29. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 3, at 87 (David

S. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne eds., Garland Publishing 1978) (1783).
30. Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804). The issue was whether the word
"administrator" in a North Carolina statute repealing a statute of limitations also
incorporated executors. Id. at 275. Counsel argued:
Even the statute of treasons, 25 Ed. 3. Stat. 5, c. 2. in which it is declared to be
petit treason "where a servant slayeth his master," has always been construed
to comprehend a servant who kills his mistress, or his master's wife; a fortiori
in a remedial statute shall the term administrator include executor.

Id.
31. Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 5 F. Cas. 235 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 2,485) (Story,
Circuit Justice).
32. Id. at 240.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 242.
35. Id. at 241-42.

2220

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2209

I agree that it is no part of the duty or functions of courts of
justice, to supply the deficiencies of legislation, or to correct
mischiefs which they have left unprovided for. That is not the
question here. But the question is, whether, if the words of a
statute admit of two interpretations, one of which makes the
legislation incomplete for its apparent object, and the other of
which will cover and redress all the mischiefs, that should be
adopted, in a statute confessedly remedial, which is the most
narrow, rather than that which is the most comprehensive, for
the reason only, that the latter will create an obligation or duty,
beyond what is imposed by the common law? It seems clear, that
in common parlance, as well as in law, the term is in an
enlarged sense sometimes used to denote any kind of a just
demand.'
Nineteenth century opinions expressed this sentiment repeatedly. For example, Justice Swayne, construing a New York
statute governing the right of a corporation to mortgage property,
commented: "A thing may be within a statute but not within its
letter, or within the letter and yet not within the statute. The intent
of the law-maker is the law." 7 Justice Brewer famously echoed this
remark in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States: "It is a
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intention of its makers."38 Almost a half century earlier
Justice Wayne had noted, "[a] thing which is within the intention
of the makers of the statute, is as much within the statute, as if it
were within the letter."39
Furthermore, there is not much limit to the kinds of laws that
courts consider "remedial," as long as they are not criminal. Nearly
every statute is remedial in some sense. Thus, nineteenth-century

36. Id. at 241.
37. Jones v. N.Y. Guar. & Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622, 626 (1879).
38. 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). For recent debate about this case, see Carol Chomsky,
Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory
Interpretation,100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000); Adrian Vermeule, LegislativeHistory and the
Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV.

1833 (1998).
39. United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 565 (1845).
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courts used the canon to interpret statutes dealing with wills,' civil
procedure,"' the liability of railroads, 2 and various obligations in
commercial settings.' In more recent times, courts have deemed
statutes as diverse as the Bankruptcy Code, 4' the Social Security
Act, 45 securities," environmental , and antitrust laws,4 8 and even
the Copyright Act 9 to be remedial in nature and subject to broad
interpretation.
A good example of the rule construing remedial statutes broadly
as applied in the regulatory state is Tennessee Coal, Iron & Road

40. See, e.g., Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804) (repealing a statute of
limitations that would have barred estate from bringing claim); Bayley v. Bailey, 59 Mass.
(5 Cush.) 245 (1849) (interpreting the definition of a will broadly); Morse v. Thompson, 58
Mass. (4 Cush.) 562 (1849) (upholding the right of a woman to execute a will).
41. See, e.g., Texas v. Chiles, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 488, 491 (1874) (interpreting a statute
that disallowed exclusion of interested-party testimony broadly); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 493, 504 (1870) (permitting tolling of the statute of limitations during the Civil
War); Mears v. Garretson, 2 Greene 316, 317 (Iowa 1849) (interpreting broadly a statute
permitting court to enter judgment in favor of judgment creditor); Hoffman v. Dawson, 11
Grant 280 (Pa. 1849) (interpreting a jurisdictional statute broadly because court was useful
in settling small controversies and disputes).
42. See, e. g., St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897); Grand Trunk Ry.
Co. v. Richardson, 91 U.S. 454, 472 (1875).
43. See, e.g., Tracy v. Truffly, 134 U.S. 206, 223 (1890) (broadly interpreting Texas law
governing assignment ofbenefita to creditors); White v. Cotzhausen, 129 U.S. 329,341(1889)
(construing Illinois Voluntary Assignment Act); Jones v. N.Y. Guar. & Indem. Co., 101 U.S.
622, 626 (1879) (interpreting New York law defining mortgages for corporations).
44. In re Caron, 82 F.3d 7, 10 (Ist Cir. 1996); In re Boone, 236 B.R. 275, 279 (M.D. Fla.
1999) ("The discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code have been traditionally construed
to be remedial and courts have uniformly held that it shall be liberally construed in favor of
the Debtor and strictly construed against a creditor who challenged the Debtor's right to a
discharge.").
45. Combs v. Gardner, 382 F.2d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 1967).
46. There is a long tradition of civil cases asserting that the securities laws are to be
interpreted broadly. See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.
1992).
47. Cases abound in which provisions of environmental statutes are construed broadly
in keeping with congressional intent. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S.
402 (1993); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985); Leslie Salt
Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995).
48. See, e.g., ASME, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 (1982).
49. See, e.g., Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 1991)
(interpreting provision awarding attorney fees to defendants narrowly: "In order not to
disserve the remedial purposes underlying the Copyright Act, a prevailing defendant should
not be awarded its costs or fees unless it can also demonstrate that the copyright owner
brought the action in bad faith or that the action was frivolous.").
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Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,50 a case interpreting the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Act required that employees receive time and
any overtime work, but the statute did not define
a half for
"work." 1 Mine owners claimed that the time it took the workers to
travel within the mines to the working faces was not "work" within
the meaning of the statute.5 2 The Supreme Court disagreed:
[Tlhese provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, are remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We
are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but
with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full
measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of
others. Those are the rights that Congress has specially
legislated to protect. Such a statute must not be interpreted or
applied in a narrow, grudging manner.53
One might expect this canon to be out of vogue today. For one
thing, Justice Scalia's textualism, which has been influential on the
Supreme Court, focuses heavily on statutory language.5 4 It would
be surprising to see a statement like Justice Wayne's today.5 5 More
in keeping with textualist philosophy is Justice Scalia's statement
that "the purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to
change, but also what it resolves to leave alone."" Combined with
this approach to statutory interpretation is a current skepticism
about New Deal regulatory legislation, the type that most often
evokes the rule. Whether driven by Justice Scalia's textualism or by
hostility toward aggressive government regulation, the current
Supreme Court occasionally has gone out of its way to interpret
remedial statutes narrowly, as it did in a series of decisions

50. 321 U.S. 590 (1944).

51. Id. at 597.
52. Id. at 592 n.2.
53. Id. at 597.
54. See ANTONIN SCALIA,AMATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). There is now a very large
literature discussing Justice Scalia's approach to statutes. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,
Textualism, the Unknown Deal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998). For my views, see Lawrence
M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 235.
55. See supra text accompanying note 39.
56. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991).

20031

STATUTORY INFLATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE

2223

interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964," ' which led Congress to
override the Court by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991.58
Notwithstanding these intuitions, federal courts apply the canon
no less frequently today than they did fifty years ago. In fact, the
United States courts of appeals are making reference to it more
than ever. 9 Even when it is not mentioned, courts routinely state
that their goal is to interpret the statute in such a way as to carry
out the will of the legislature.6 0 When a legislature enacts a statute
to install a broad mechanism for combating a perceived evil such as
water pollution or antitrust violations, courts are bound to interpret
the statute more broadly whether or not they announce their
intention to do so.
At times, disagreements have arisen about whether a statute is
remedial or penal. For example, in 1885, the Supreme Court
interpreted a New York statute similar to the one construed by
Justice Story some forty years earlier, but came to the opposite
conclusion. Chase v. Curtis61 concerned the scope of a statute
imposing personal liability on corporate officials for debts the
corporation failed to report in annual publications as required by
law. The Court relied on New York cases that regarded the statute
as penal in nature. 62 Other cases question whether a statute should
57. Id. at 102 (holding that expenses for expert witnesses are not part of"attorney's fees"
for purposes of interpreting statute that shifts the cost of attorney's fees to the government
when a plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of federal rights); Ward Cove Packing Co., Inc.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-58 (1989) (setting forth standards for proving employment
discrimination based on disparate impact).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (providing for "expert fees" in fee-shifting provision as
added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overriding W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83
(1991)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congressional Findings, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat.
1071 ("The Congress finds that ... the Decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing
Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal
civil rights protections.").
59. ALEXIS search of "remedial statute w/8 (broad! or liberal!)" in the library containing
courts of appeals cases yielded 120 hits for the 1990s, 101 hits for the 1980s, 41 hits for the
1970s, 20 hits for the 1960s and 19 hits for the 1950s. The Supreme Court during this period
made mention of the canon only occasionally, with no decrease in frequency during the 1990s
(5 hits).
60. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001) ("The phrase
'affecting commerce' indicates Congress' intent to regulate to the outer limits of its authority
under the Commerce Clause.").
61. 113 U.S. 452 (1885).
62. Id. at 457. None of the cases on which the Court relied were decided before 1860.
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be construed broadly because it is remedial, or narrowly because it
is in derogation of the common law. 3
These cases illustrate the point Karl Llewellyn made fifty years
ago: Courts sometimes create an illusion of rational decision
making by choosing among conflicting canons of construction.6 ' Yet
there has never been a period in American legal history in which
the canon calling for liberal interpretation of remedial statutes was
abandoned. Although the canon does not accurately predict results
in individual cases, it nonetheless is entrenched deeply in the
courts' arsenal of rhetorical weapons. We will see below that its
application is more predictable than it may seem at first glance.
b. The Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity, about which Blackstone also wrote,"' has been
part of the statutory jurisprudence in this country from the
beginning. The primary justifications for the rule are fair notice to
defendants and separation of powers. Chief Justice John Marshall
articulated the rule in an 1821 case, United States v. Wiltberger,6
in which the Supreme Court held that a statute granting federal
jurisdiction over cases involving manslaughter committed on an
American vessel in the high seas did not apply to a vessel docked on
a river in China. Marshall stated:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps
not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the
plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature,

63. See, e.g., Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 19 (1879) (interpreting narrowly a
statute defining fire emergency actions).
64. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decisionand the Rules or Canons
about How Statutes are to be Construed,3 VAND. L. REV. 395,395-96 (1950); see also Richard
A. Posner, StatutoryInterpretation-Inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cml. L.
REV. 800 (1983).
65. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, § 3, at 88.
66. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820). I discuss this case, and the rule of lenity more generally
in Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1998). I will
outline the rule's use and history only briefly here.
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not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.
The rule of lenity continues to be part of American jurisprudence,
although commentators have criticized it both for its erratic
application and because it can be used tojustify unnaturally narrow
interpretations of criminal statutes."8 During the past fifty years,
however, the predominant version of the rule has been a narrow
one, applied only if other methods of statutory interpretation fail to
provide sufficient certainty about the legislature's intention. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Callanan v. United States69 contains the
seminal explanation of this position:
[T]hat "rule," [the rule of lenity] as is true of any guide to
statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving an
ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. "To rest upon a
formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death." Mr. Justice
Holmes in Collected Legal Papers, p. 306. The rule comes into
operation at the end of the process of constructing what
Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers. That is not the
function of the judiciary. F0
Frankfurter's vision of lenity departs from Marshall's more
textually-oriented approach. Marshall places a heavier burden on
the legislature to enact clear rules. The Frankfurter version of the
rule, in contrast, acts more like a tie-breaker when detailed
analysis provides no satisfactory answer. For the most part, it is
Frankfurter's version of the rule that predominates today, although
those members of the Supreme Court who are more loyal to the

67. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 95.
68. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 198-201 (1985); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and FederalCommon
Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345; see also Livingston Hall, Strict or LiberalConstruction
of PenalStatutes, 48 HARV. L. REv. 748 (1935) (articulating his classic and still widely-cited
views). For an opposing view that supports a narrow version of the rule of lenity, see Solan,
supra note 66.

69. 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
70. Id. at 596.
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statute's text, especially Justice Scalia, would apply the rule of
lenity more broadly in keeping with Marshall's model.7
Although there is rarely consensus among Supreme Court
Justices about the rule's application in any particular case, no
Supreme Court Justice has ever argued that the rule of lenity
should be abandoned, even when the composition of the Court has
been conservative. Scholars have taken this position, but their
arguments have not influenced the judiciary.7 2 And although some
state legislatures repealed the rule by statute more than one
hundred years ago, judges in those states continue to apply it in
cases that leave them with no principled means for deciding how
the legislature intended a particular criminal statute to be
interpreted.7 3 It is only fair to conclude that although the rule of
lenity is not applied uniformly, it is a principle that courts routinely
consider in deciding cases that involve disputes about the
applicability of criminal statutes.
2. Application of the StandardModel: Two Examples
The standard model calls for courts to interpret a dual-remedy
statute broadly in remedial contexts, narrowly in criminal contexts.
As noted above, however, courts do not act according to the
standard model. For many statutes afforded liberal interpretation
in civil cases, the question of lenity in criminal cases rarely arises.
There are two reasons for this. The first is prosecutorial discretion.
When enforcement of a criminal statute is not considered a matter
of high priority, perhaps in part because civil remedies for the same
conduct are considered adequate, prosecutors will tend to pursue
only the most egregious violations. 74 This has the effect of
simulating lenity without judicial intervention: Criminal liability
attaches only when there has been a clear violation of the law.
71. The debate between Justices Thurgood Marshall and Scalia in Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990), illustrates the two views. Marshall, writing for the majority,
found the statute sufficiently clear and refused to apply the rule of lenity. In doing so, he
relied in large part on the legislative history ofthe statute in question. Id. at 107-10. Justice
Scalia dissented. Not anxious to make too much of the legislative history, he found the
statute ambiguous and argued that lenity should apply. Id. at 129-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. See supra note 68.
73. See Solan, supra note 66, at 123-28 (discussing this situation and citing cases).
74. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Second, most dual-remedy statutes contain an elevated mens rea
requirement for criminal prosecution. It is easiest to infer willfulness, for example, from clear violations of a statute. Thus, for
statutes that are not typically the subject of criminal prosecution,
the system tends to simulate the standard model without engaging
in separate interpretations. Prosecutions under the Copyright Act
and of bankruptcy crimes illustrate this dynamic.
a. The Copyright Act
The Copyright Act provides a good example of the standard model
at work. Courts do not engage in separate interpretations of the
Copyright Act depending. on whether the case is civil or criminal.
Yet courts sometimes refer to the Copyright Act as "remedial" in
civil cases, typically when they are justifying implementation of the
Act's broad civil remedies." Moreover, although a great deal of civil
litigation is brought under the copyright laws, criminal charges
are brought only rarely. A recent survey indicates that of 3300
published copyright opinions from 1948 through 1997, only sixtyeight (two percent) involved criminal cases. 6 When they are
brought, the cases are typically clear cut, at least from a statutory
perspective. Disputes are resolved in favor of lenity.
For example, in Dowling v. United States,7 7 the government had
indicted Dowling for violating the Stolen Property Act" by shipping
bootleg recordings of Elvis Presley in commerce without the
permission of the copyright owners. 9 The question was whether
materials that were not physically stolen, but which were shipped
in violation of the Copyright Act, should be considered "stolen"
under the statute.' The district court convicted Dowling after a
bench trial, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 81 The Supreme Court
75. See Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 1991).
76. Ting Ting Wu, The New Criminal Copyright Sanctions: A Toothless Tiger?, 39 IDEA
527, 529 (1999).
77. 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000). The statute makes it a crime to "transport ... in interstate
or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of
$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud."
79. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 209.
80. Id.
81. United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1984).
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reversed the conviction, relying heavily on the rule of lenity. 2
Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that the defendant's8
conduct did not fit plainly within the language of the statute.
Perhaps more significantly, the crux of the accusations involved
copyright violations. The Copyright Act itself contains criminal
penalties under certain circumstances, which were not present. The
Court held that the government should not be permitted to use the
Stolen Property Act as a means for expanding criminal copyright
liability beyond the rather narrow limits that Congress legislated.8 '
Blackmun wrote in this regard:
Thus, the history of the criminal infringement provisions of the
Copyright Act reveals a good deal of care on Congress' part
before subjecting copyright infringement to serious criminal
penalties. First, Congress hesitated long before imposing felony
sanctions on copyright infringers. Second, when it did so, it
carefully chose those areas of infringement that required severe
response-specifically, sound recordings and motion picturesand studiously graded penalties even in those areas of
heightened concern. This step-by-step, carefully considered
approach is consistent with Congress' traditional sensitivity to
the special concerns implicated by the copyright laws. 85
Such rebuffs are not needed often. Published opinions sometimes
show prosecutors bringing criminal charges for fairly minor
copyright infringements," but not cases in which the legal status of
the alleged infringement is seriously in dispute. In contrast, many
other federal statutes with both civil and criminal remedies, such
as the Clean Water Act, RICO, and the Securities Exchange Act,
are the source of constant litigation about what should constitute
a crime. 87 Why should these differences occur?
82. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 214-18.
83. Id. at 218.
84. Id. at 220-21.
85. Id. at 225.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb. 1991). For further
discussion, see Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization,Commodification, Criminalization:The
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness
Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 870 (1999).
87. The Clean Water Act and the Securities Exchange Act are discussed in Part I.B (the
inflationary model). RICO is discussed in Part I.D (the law enforcement model).
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Part of the explanation involves the statutes themselves. The
Copyright Act requires proof of "willful" violation in criminal
cases,8 8 and contains substantive statutory defenses that the
government must overcome.8 9 Courts do not agree on the meaning
of "willful," and Congress has not defined the term.' The majority
position, however, seems to be reflected in UnitedStates v. Moran,9 1
in which Magistrate Judge Kopf noted that:
"[illfully"means that in order to be criminal the infringement
must have been a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty." I am so persuaded because I believe that in using
the word "willful" Congress intended to soften the impact of the
common-law presumption that ignorance of the law or mistake
of the law is no defense to a criminal prosecution by making
specific intent to violate the law an element of federal criminal
copyright offenses.92

Simply put, it is not easy for a federal prosecutor to win a criminal
copyright prosecution unless the case is a clear, intentional violation of the statute.
The other part of the explanation involves institutional choices.
There is no Copyright Enforcement Commission, or other such
administrative agency. Thus, there are no regulations that receive
Chevron deference in criminal cases. Nor are there government
lawyers attempting to convince the courts to interpret the
Copyright Act even more expansively in civil cases for the common
good. And because there is no Copyright Bureau in the Department
of Justice whose only job it is to prosecute copyright cases, criminal
copyright cases fall on the United States Attorneys' offices, which
must use discretion in deciding how much of their limited resources
they should devote to them.
This point is important in light of Congress' 1997 expansion of
criminal liability for copyright infringement in the No Electronic

88. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
89. Most significant are the defenses of fair use and first sale. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)
(fair use); id. § 109 (first sale).
90. See infra Part II.B (analyzing the imposition of strong mens rea requirement).
91. 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb. 1991).
92. Id. at 1049 (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991)).
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Theft (NET) Act.9" NET expanded criminal copyright liability by
making it possible, for the first time, for a person to be convicted
without having infringed for commercial advantage or private
financial gain.94 NET amended the Copyright Act to make it a
crime to infringe "by the reproduction or distribution, including by
electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or
phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total
retail value of more than $1,000.""5
Even supporters of NET in Congress expressed concern that this
language might criminalize socially acceptable and rather minor
infractions of the statute. As Professor Loren notes, the House
Report states that "the Justice Department wanted the threshold
lowered from the originally proposed 10 copies and retail value of
$5,000 to the adopted level of one copy and retail value of $1,000
because it anticipated wanting to pursue smaller-scale infringers."96
The bill's supporters recognized that the statute was overly broad
as drafted. Senator Hatch expressed concern, but felt the "willfully"
requirement would serve to prevent inappropriate prosecutions.97
It would be difficult to deny that reducing the government's
burden of proof is likely to increase the number of criminal
prosecutions. However, unless the Supreme Court decides that the
"violation of a known legal duty" requirement articulated in Moran
is more than the government must prove, the combination of the
statute's mens rea requirements, the statutory defenses, and the
lack of institutional incentives are likely to inhibit any serious
changes in the way United States Attorneys view copyright
prosecutions. The standard model will likely continue to control.

93. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) [hereinafter NET] (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 17 and 18 U.S.C.).
94. These are still grounds for criminal liability under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1), but they are
no longer the only grounds.
95. NET § 2(b) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2)).
96. Loren, supra note 86, at 870 n.196 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-339, at 7 (1997)).
97. 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch). For
discussion of this statement and other salient legislative history, see Loren, supra note 86,
at 888-90; Note, The CriminalizationofCopyright Infringement in the DigitalEra,112 HARV.
L. REV. 1705, 1716 (1999).
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b. Bankruptcy Crimes
Crimes for violation of the United States Bankruptcy Code98 are
defined in §§ 151 through 157 of the federal Criminal Code.99 The
criminal provisions cover various species of fraud that are typically
committed in bankruptcy proceedings. The types of conduct that
may be prosecuted as bankruptcy crimes are the same as those
that form the basis of a denial of discharge under § 727(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code.' 00 For example, under §§ 727(a)(3) and (4), a
discharge should be denied if:
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or
failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including
books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor's
financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of
the circumstances of the case;
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection
with the case(A) made a false oath or account;
(B) presented or used a false claim .... 101
Correspondingly, the Criminal Code makes it a crime to:
(1) knowingly and fraudulently conceal[] from a custodian,
trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court charged with the
control or custody of property, or, in connection with a case
under title 11, from creditors or the United States Trustee, any
property belonging to the estate of a debtor;
(2) knowingly and fraudulently make [I a false oath or account in
or in relation to any case under title 11;
(3) knowingly and fraudulently make[] a false declaration,
certificate, verification, or statement under penalty ofperjury as
permitted under section 1746 of title 28, in or in relation to any

case under title 11

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

..

02

11 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
18 U.S.C. §§ 151-157 (2000).
11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2000).
Id. § 727(3)-(4). There are ten subsections in total.
18 U.S.C. § 152(1)-(3). There are nine subsections in total.
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Conduct that violates one statute is nearly the same as conduct that
violates the other. Yet, many petitioners are denied discharges
although very few are convicted of bankruptcy crimes., 3
The reasons for this disparity are a mixture of statutory
interpretation and institutional choice. The Department of Justice
has not devoted the resources to prosecuting bankruptcy crimes
that it might. 10 4 As in the case of the Copyright Act, there is neither
a bureau within the Department of Justice whose job it is to do so,
nor an agency in charge of enforcement in civil cases with the power
and resources to press federal prosecutors successfully. United
States Attorneys' offices are likely to pursue only the most
egregious cases of bankruptcy fraud, which means that the selection
of cases simulates a system in which courts routinely apply lenity
to ensure that only the clearest violations are considered crimes. At
the same time, civil bankruptcy cases proceed under ordinary
canons of construction designed to effectuate the legislative
purpose.
In this context, when disputes arise over the applicability of
criminal provisions, courts frequently do apply the rule of lenity in
determining whether a bankruptcy crime has been committed. For
example, in United States v. Lee, 1"5 the court applied the rule of
lenity in dismissing a bankruptcy crime indictment, noting that the
rule "directs us to resolve ambiguities in a criminal statute so as to
apply it only to conduct the statute clearly covers.""° A consent
order that the defendant had filed in a bankruptcy case failed to
disclose various earlier payments that might have been fraudulent.
The government argued that this order constituted a violation of
§ 157(2), which makes it illegal to "file[] a document in a proceeding
under title 11 ... for the purpose of executing or concealing ... a

scheme or artifice [to defraud] ...."'0o The court rejected this theory
on the ground that any fraud was already completed by the time the
allegedly fraudulent filing occurred. On motion for reconsideration,
the government argued that other statutes, such as the mail fraud
103. This point is made astutely by Tamara Ogier and Jack F. Williams in Bankruptcy
Crimes and Bankruptcy Practice, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 317, 347 (1998).
104. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
105. 82 F. Supp. 2d 384 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
106. Id. at 387.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 157(2) (2000).
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statute, had been interpreted broadly to include acts that may not
have occurred until after the fraud had been completed and that the
bankruptcy crime provisions should be interpreted similarly.'l The
court rejected this argument, in part on grounds of lenity:
Similar though the language of the bankruptcy fraud statute
is to that of the various other fraud statutes, we cannot,
particularly as a matter of what appears to be first impression,
import wholesale into the bankruptcy fraud statute the thick
judicial gloss that has been applied over the years to these other
statutes.1°9
The Lee court's holding is in accord with other cases that have
held the rule of lenity to apply to bankruptcy crime prosecutions. "0
It is also in accord with a series of opinions reading a materiality
requirement into the definition of a bankruptcy crime. Unlike the
federal perjury statute, which makes it a crime to make false
statements only with respect to a material issue, 1 1 the bankruptcy
crime statutes contain no materiality requirement on their face.112
Yet, it is universally accepted that a successful prosecution under
§ 152 requires proof that any false statement made was material.1 '
This requirement makes sense. It would not advance the purposes
of the statute if an offhand remark that had nothing to do with the

108. Lee, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94.
109. Id. at 392.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 144 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v.
Brimberry, 779 F.2d 1339, 1348 (8th Cir. 1985).
111. The perjury statute states in relevant part:
Whoever(1) having taken an oath ... that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly,

or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him
subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any

material matter which he does not believe to be true ... is guilty of perjury and
shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fired under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
112. See supratext accompanying notes 101-02 (quoting the relevant parts of the statute).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Key, 859 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[TIhe essence of

the offense under § 152 is the making of a materially false statement or oath with the intent
to defraud the bankruptcy court ...."); United States v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir.

1979).
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bankruptcy proceedings later became the basis of a criminal
prosecution.
This is not to say that materiality is itself construed narrowly.
Numerous cases hold that materiality requires only that "the false
oath or account relate to some significant aspect of the bankruptcy
case or proceeding in which it was given, or that it pertain to the
discovery of assets or to the debtor's financial transactions,""
rejecting arguments that the government must prove actual harm
to a creditor as a result of the false statement." 5 Nonetheless, these
holdings are still entirely consistent with the lenity approach to
bankruptcy crime prosecutions. The fact that a judicially imposed
restriction on the definition of a crime is not interpreted with
maximum breadth does not mean that courts are interpreting the
statute itself broadly.
In contrast, it is a constant refrain in civil bankruptcy cases that
the statute should be construed liberally to give debtors the fresh
start the statute envisions. 16 Although the Code's exceptions to
discharge are interpreted narrowly," 7 occasionally by means of
analogy to the rule of lenity itself,"8 the contrast between the
approach to civil and criminal cases reflects an attitude toward the
statutes consistent with the standard model: Civil cases are
governed by an effort to effectuate the broader remedial purposes
of the statute."' This may require interpreting some provisions
broadly and others narrowly. Criminal cases are governed by the
rule of lenity.
This assessment is in disagreement with some recent discussion.
For example, Stephanie Wickouski's recent book on bankruptcy
crimes makes the following observation:

114. United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578, 588 (7th Cir. 1999).
115. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 427, 432-33 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1976).
116. See, e.g., Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In
keeping with the 'fresh start' purposes behind the Bankruptcy Code, courts should construe

§ 727 liberally in favor of debtors and strictly against parties objecting to discharge.").
117. See, e.g., In re Scarlata, 127 B.R. 1004, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

118. See Tusco Grocers v. Coatney (In re Coatney), 185 B.R. 546, 550 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
119. There are many examples. See, e.g., Checkers Drive-In Rests., Inc. v. Comm'r of
Patents and Trademarks, 51 F.3d 1078, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining the broad
interpretation given to provisions granting automatic stay).
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In cases in which the conflicting terminology is the basis for a
defense argument that no crime was committed, courts have
generally interpreted the Bankruptcy Criminal Code broadly.
This tendency would appear to fly in the face of the rule of
lenity. One explanation for this departure is that due process
and lenity arguments are rarely argued in such cases. Another
explanation is the judicial view that a debtor's entry into the
bankruptcy process provides fair warning of both the letter and
the spirit of the law. This view appears to underlie many of the
decisions which broadly construe Bankruptcy Criminal Code
provisions. This approach, however, is not completely consistent
with lenity." °
There is a grain of truth to this assessment, but it largely misses
the mark. Consider, for example, the Second Circuit's decision in
Sabbeth v. United States.'2 1 In contemplation of putting the
corporation he owned into bankruptcy, Stephen Sabbeth first
transferred corporate funds from the company to himself, and
subsequently transferred those funds again to secret accounts in
the names of various individuals, sometimes using phony social
security numbers to open the accounts.12 2 Sabbeth was indicted,
tried, and convicted of concealing these corporate assets in violation
of § 152(7) of the criminal code."2 3 He argued, perhaps with some
technical justification, that at the time he secreted the funds, they
no longer belonged to the corporation. Rather, they belonged to him,
since he had transferred the funds to himself. Granted, his title was
voidable, because the funds were most likely preferences or
fraudulent transfers under federal and state law, but title had
shifted to him once the funds went into his account, and therefore,
he could not have violated the statute by concealing corporate
assets. The court rejected these arguments, holding that "'property
STEPHANIE WICKOUSKI, BANKRUPTcY CRIMES 18 (2000).
262 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 211.
The section makes it a crime if a person
in a personal capacity or as an agent or officer of any person or corporation, in
contemplation of a case under title 11 by or against the person or any other
person or corporation, or with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11,
knowingly and fraudulently transfers or conceals any of his property or the
property of such other person or corporation ....
18 U.S.C. § 152(7) (2000).
120.
121.
122.
123.
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of... [a] corporation' under Section 152(7) ... include[s] all property
that would have belonged to the debtor but for a preferential or
fraudulent transfer by the defendant."1 24 The court called its
interpretation "commonsensical" based on the purpose of the
statute and its relationship to various provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.' 28
Cases like Sabbeth show that my characterization of how courts
deal with bankruptcy crimes is not absolute. Courts will not always
apply the rule of lenity mechanically in order to accept the
narrowest possible interpretation of a bankruptcy crime. Yet as we
saw above, the rule of lenity is very much alive and well in the
courts' interpretation of criminal bankruptcy provisions.
Even more telling is the fact that there are so few prosecutions.
Ogier and Williams have studied the number of criminal referrals
from the United States Trustees and the number of convictions for
bankruptcy crimes during most of the 1990s.' 26 In 1990, there were
369 referrals, and a total of forty convictions.' 27 By 1997, those
numbers had grown to 712 referrals and eighty-seven convictions.'2
Ogier and Williams recognized that their statistics may underreport
convictions. A study by Craig Peyton Gaumer suggests that they
did, but that the numbers are still very small. According to Gaumer,
the number of convictions was seventy in 1990, 130 in 1997, and
reached a high of 176 in 1998.129 During those years, the number
of bankruptcy filings were 783,000, 1,404,000, and 1,443,000,
respectively.' The overall picture shows such little enforcement
that Gaumer found no prosecutions during a ten-year period in
twenty-two federal districts. 3 '
From time to time, the Attorney General has expressed concern
about the underenforcement of criminal bankruptcy statutes. For
example, during the Clinton Administration, Attorney General
Reno initiated Operation Total Disclosure in 1996, leading to a
124. Sabbeth, 262 F.3d at 216.
125. Id.

126. Ogier & Williams, supra note 103, at 348-53.
127. Id. at 351.
128. Id. at 353.
129. Craig Peyton Gaumer, Policing the Bankruptcy System: An Informal Statistical
Analysis of U.S. Bankruptcy Fraud Prosecutions,74 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 (2000).
130. Id. at 8, 34.
131. Id. at 34.
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significant increase in prosecutions.1 2 Attorney General Barr,
toward the end of the first Bush Administration in 1992, also
engaged in an aggressive plan, which resulted in a step-up in
criminal bankruptcy cases. 183 Nonetheless, it is self-evident that
there is very little enforcement of these statutes, although public
statements from the top of the Justice Department hierarchy seem
to make a small difference. All commentators call for more effort
from the Department of Justice, either by having routine audits of
bankruptcy filings by United States Attorneys offices13 4 or by
appointing Assistant United States Attorneys 35
on a regional basis to
specialize in bankruptcy crime prosecutions.
Absent from the discussion is the possible relationship between
the institutional framework in which the law is enforced and the
ways in which judges interpret the statutes. I suggest that the
current balance of interpretation in the courts is at least in part a
function of the current state of enforcement structures. If the
Department of Justice forms the equivalent of a bankruptcy crimes
bureau, sooner or later the team of prosecutors dedicated to
eliminating bankruptcy fraud will take more aggressive positions
with respect to the interpretation of the statutes. Ultimately, some
courts are likely to accept these interpretations. Public choice
theory suggests that institutions often conduct themselves in ways
that will ensure their own status and longevity. 136 1 am suggesting
that this dynamic plays a role not only in the selection of cases that
are prosecuted, but also in the development of the substantive law,
because courts often respond to the heightened activity of large
governmental enforcement efforts. To see how this dynamic works,
we turn to the inflationary model in the next section.
B. The Inflationary Model
Even when the courts commit themselves to interpreting a
statute broadly in civil cases and narrowly in criminal ones,
132. See Ogier & Williams, supra note 103, at 325-26.
133. Gaumer, supra note 129, at 8.
134. Ogier & Williams, supranote 103, at 355-56.
135. Gaumer, supra note 129, at 34.

136. For an introduction to some of the major concepts of public choice theory, see DANIEL
A- FARBER & PmLIP P. FmcKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
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contextual changes brought about by the history of interpretation
make it impractical to carry out this plan, leading to broad interpretation in both contexts. But the issue of broad interpretation of
criminal statutes arises in other contexts as well. Here we will look
at examples of statutory inflation in three different statutory
schemes: the Securities Exchange Act, the Sherman Act, and the
Clean Water Act.
1. Insider Trading and Inflation of the Securities Laws
Perhaps the most dramatic example of statutory inflation lies in
the area of securities law. Rule 10b-5, the principal antifraud
regulation promulgated under the securities laws, says nothing
about insider trading. 137 Rather, the rule addresses deceit and fraud
generally. Nonetheless, the enforcement division of the Securities
and Exchange Commission began charging corporate directors who
traded on inside information with Rule 10b-5 violations in civil
enforcement proceedings. 138 In 1968, the Second Circuit affirmed an
SEC insider trading decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.' 9
In so doing, it held that "the securities laws should be interpreted
as an expansion of the common law both to effectuate the broad
remedial design of Congress ... and to insure uniformity of enforce-

ment

.... 140

Subsequently, civil plaintiffs, using the implied private right of
action under Rule 10b-5, began bringing successful actions against
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). That rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or)
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
138. See, e.g., In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 1971 SEC LEXIS 992 (July 29, 1971); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The history discussed in this section is derived in large
part from Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information-A Breach in
Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 87-91 (1998).
139. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
140. Id. at 855 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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those who disseminated and traded on inside information. In
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Inc.," the Second Circuit held that its2
reasoning in Texas GulfSulphur also applied in private lawsuits. 14
For support, it quoted the Supreme Court's admonition that the
securities laws be construed broadly to effectuate their remedial
purpose.14 It also expanded insider trading doctrine further, by not
requiring that the plaintiffs prove that the actual shares they
purchased on the open market were the same shares that the
defendants sold. Rather, the defendants had breached a duty to "all
persons who during the same period purchased Douglas stock in the
open market without knowledge of the material inside information
which was in the possession of defendants."'"
It was not until 1980 that the Supreme Court approved prosecution of insider trading as a criminal violation of Rule 10b-5. In
Chiarellav. United States,"5 the Court reversed the conviction of
an employee of a financial printer who bought stock based on
information he had read in the course of printing announcements
146
of corporate takeover bids that had not yet been made public.
Though the Court held that the employee owed no duty, it embraced
the position that insider trading could constitute a violation of Rule
10b-5, and that prosecution for such violators was appropriate." 7
The Court relied on earlier administrative decisions and circuit
court decisions in civil cases, including Texas Gulf Sulphur.148 It did
not mention the fact that Chiarellawas a criminal case, whereas all
the earlier ones were civil, and it certainly did not consider the rule
of lenity. 149 Thus, criminal application of Rule 10b-5 in the context
141. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).

142. Id. at 236.
143. Id. at 235 ("Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of
avoiding frauds to be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
its remedial purposes.'") (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972)).
144. Id. at 237. Subsequently, the Supreme Court endorsed the "fraud on the market"
theory of Rule 10b-5 liability. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
145. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
146. Id. at 224.
147. Id. at 227-28.
148. Id. at 229-30.

149. Roberta Karmel has recognized the tension between the broad interpretation of
remedial statutes and the rule of lenity in the context of insider trading cases. See
Transcript, Roundtable on Insider Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory after O'Hagan, 20
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of insider trading grew out of the broad interpretation of the rule in
civil cases, in part as the result of aggressive administrative
enforcement actions brought earlier by the SEC.150
In 1997, a second inflationary event involving the law of insider
trading occurred. In United States v. O'Hagan,5 1 the Supreme
Court endorsed the misappropriation theory of securities fraud.' 52
The Court based its decision on civil precedents, two law review
articles, an extremely narrow reading of the Court's earlier
precedents, and the Chevron doctrine.
James O'Hagan was a Minneapolis lawyer whose firm represented Grand Metropolitan PLC, a company that was planning to
make a tender offer to buy shares of Pillsbury Company. Before the
merger was publicly announced, O'Hagan began buying shares and
options of Pillsbury. Once the merger was announced, the price of
Pillsbury shares shot up. O'Hagan sold and made more than four
million dollars.
O'Hagan was indicted for securities fraud. The government first
alleged that he had violated § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 193453 and Rule 10b-5. The prosecution was aggressive. In
prototypical insider trading cases, the defendant takes material
information from a company to which he has a fiduciary duty, and
uses that information for improper personal gain. But O'Hagan's
CARDOZO L. REV. 7, 15 (1998).
150. It is not unusual for civil and criminal cases to arise from the same set of
circumstances, which may lead to complicated intragovernmental issues. See Thomas C.

Newkirk & Ira L. Brandriss, The Advantages ofa Dual System: ParallelStreams of Civil and
Criminal Enforcement of U.S. SecuritiesLaws, 2 INT'L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 29 (2000). For a

thorough and insightful discussion of the history of insider trading doctrine, see WILLIAM
KS. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING ch.4 (1996).
151. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
152. Id. at 647.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). The statute reads:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any

facility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the (Securities and Exchange] Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
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firm did not represent Pillsbury, the company whose stock he was
trading. The alleged fraud was based on the theory that O'Hagan
had misappropriated information from his law firm and had used
that misappropriated information in the purchase and sale of
securities without disclosing his activities. At the time of the trial,
the Supreme Court had not passed on the misappropriation theory,
and lower courts remained divided. 5 ' Second, the government
alleged that O'Hagan had violated § 14(e) of the Exchange Act 5'
and Rule 14e-3(a), promulgated thereunder by the SEC.156 O'Hagan
was convicted of securities fraud and other crimes. The Eighth
Circuit reversed the convictions,"' and the Supreme Court reversed
again.'58
The most difficult problem facing the government was that the
Supreme Court had twice held in criminal cases that defendants
who had no relationship with the company whose stock they were
154. For discussion of the state of the law at that time, see O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 649-50.
155. The Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer .... The
[SEC] shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000).
156. According to the rule:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of
section 14(e) of the [Exchange] Act for any other person who is in possession of
material information relating to such tender offer which information he knows
or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know
has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender
offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or
cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities
convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or
right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless
within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information
and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2002).
157. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
158. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 578.
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trading could not be held liable for insider trading under the
securities laws.' 59 In Chiarella,the Court had held that the printer
had no fiduciary duty to any of the parties, and therefore violated
no legal duty."16 The O'Hagan Court explained that Chiarelladid
not preclude future holdings that a fiduciary duty with another
party could lead to criminal liability:
Chiarellathus expressly left open the misappropriation theory
before us today. Certain statements in Chiarella,however, led
the Eighth Circuit in the instant case to conclude that § 10(b)
liability hinges exclusively on a breach of duty owed to a
purchaser or seller of securities. The Court said in Chiarella
that § 10(b) liability "is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between partiesto a
transaction,"(emphasis added), and observed that the printshop
employee defendant in that case "was not a person in whom the
sellers had placed their trust and confidence." These statements
rejected the notion that § 10(b) stretches so far as to impose "a

general duty between all participants in market transactions to
forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information," and we
confine them to that context. The statements highlighted by the
Eighth Circuit, in short, appear in an opinion carefully leaving
for future resolution the validity of the misappropriation61 theory,
and therefore cannot be read to foreclose that theory.
The Supreme Court had used similar language three years after
Chiarella in Dirks v. SEC, 162 in which it held that a financial
analyst who traded based on information he received from a former
employee of a corporation did not violate § 10 in a civil case brought
by the SEC. 16 The O'HaganCourt also indicated that it had left the
door open in Dirks64for application of the misappropriation theory of
securities fraud. 1

In Carpenterv. United States,165 the Court unanimously upheld
the mail fraud and wire fraud convictions of R. Foster Winans, a
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 650 n.4.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 234-35.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 662 (citations omitted).
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 665-67.
O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 662-63.
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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journalist for the Wall Street Journal, his roommate, David
Carpenter, and various people at a brokerage house, for a scheme

that involved the sale of information to the brokerage in advance of
the "Heard on the Street" column's publication.1"' Although the
167
Second Circuit had also affirmed convictions for securities fraud,
the Supreme Court was divided four-to-four on that issue, and
securities fraud conviction without opinion or
affirmed the
168
discussion.
Thus, by the time O'Hagan was decided, both the Justice
Department and the SEC for many years had been attempting to
expand liability for insider trading. They had failed twice before the
Supreme Court, and had won an affirmance by an equally divided
Court. O'Hagan,the government's fourth effort, was a success. This
is not to say that the decision in O'Hagan cannot be justified.
Among defendants Chiarella, Dirks, and O'Hagan, most people
would agree that O'Hagan was the worst actor. Nonetheless, to the
extent that criminal liability must be based on fair notice, O'Hagan
did not have such notice and Justice Scalia made this point the
basis of his brief dissent.1 6 9
On what authority did the Court base its decision? First, the
Court relied on the language of Rule 10b-5, which makes it illegal
"to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." 7 ° The rule does not
specify against whom the deceit must occur. This reading of the
rule, though perfectly consistent with its language, is by no means
necessary. One could easily understand the rule to apply only to
166. Id. at 28.
167. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1987).
168. The traditional practice of the Supreme Court to refrain from issuing opinions when
they are evenly split "may be designed to avoid having the opinion supporting the judgment
of affirmance treated as precedent..." Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 662 n.77 (2002).
169. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia:
In light of that principle [the rule of lenity], it seems to me that the

unelaborated statutory language: "[t]o use or employ in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance," § 10(b), must be construed to require the manipulation or
deception of a party to a securities transaction.

Id. (alteration in original).
170. Id. at 651 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1996)).
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frauds committed against the other party to the transaction, as
Justice Scalia did in his dissent. 171 My point is not that the Court
was wrong-minded; only that the Court used the broadest
interpretation of the rule that its language permits.
Second, the Court relied heavily on two law review articles by
Professor Aldave that criticized the Court's earlier insider trading
jurisprudence and encouraged the adoption of the misappropriation
theory. 172 In fact, the Court cited these articles seven times in the
majority opinion. Finally, the Court noted that its decision was
consistent with an earlier decision in a civil case brought under the
securities statutes, in which the Court placed certain limits on Rule
10b-5 claims in the context of mergers.17 ' The best explanation the
Court could offer to reconcile Chiarella and Dirks was that those
cases did not preclude the Court's later endorsement of the
misappropriation theory.
The Court's decision to uphold O'Hagan's conviction under Rule
14e-3 is subject to similar analysis. Section 14(e) makes it illegal "to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer .. Rule 14e-3(a)
makes it a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practice to use
nonpublic information obtained from the offering party to trade in
stock or options in the target company. 175 O'Hagan clearly did just
that. The only question facing the Court was whether Rule 14e-3
was a valid exercise of the SEC's rulemaking authority. On that
issue, the Court held:
A prophylactic measure, because its mission is to prevent,
typically encompasses more than the core activity prohibited. As
we noted in Schreiber,§ 14(e)'s rulemaking authorization gives
the Commission "latitude," even in the context of a term of art
like "manipulative," "to regulate nondeceptive activities as a
'reasonably designed' means of preventing manipulative acts,
171. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 650 n.4, 654 (citing Barbara Bader Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory:
Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 373 (1988); Barbara Bader Aldave,
Misappropriation:A General Theory of Liabilityfor Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1984)).

173. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 644 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000).
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2002).
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without suggesting any change in the meaning of the term
manipulative' itself." 472 U.S. at 11, n. 11. We hold, accordingly,
that under § 14(e), the Commission may prohibit acts not
themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the
prohibition is "reasonably designed to prevent ... acts and
practices [that] are fraudulent." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
Because Congress has authorized the Commission, in § 14(e),
to prescribe legislative rules, we owe the Commission's
judgment "more than mere deference or weight." Batterton v.
Francis,432 U.S. 416,424-426 (1977). Therefore, in determining
whether Rule 14e-3(a)'s "disclose or abstain from trading"
requirement is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent acts,
we must accord the Commission's assessment "controlling
weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984). In this case, we
conclude, the Commission's assessment is none of these.'76
Under current doctrine, the Court was clearly correct. The
Chevron doctrine, upon which the Court relied, requires courts to
defer to agency rulemaking if the agency demonstrates a reasonable
reading of the statute. But in this case, the agency's reading of
the statute was clearly inflationary when the rule was applied
criminally. The standard model requires that criminal statutes be
applied narrowly to give fair notice and to ensure appropriate
application of separation of powers principles. Here, in contrast, the
SEC's reading was expansive and "prophylactic," consistent with
the policy of interpreting remedial statutes broadly. The Court
argued that defendants are protected notwithstanding such a broad
reading because criminal convictions for securities fraud require
proof of willful violation.' The truth of that statement depends in
part on how courts interpret the willfulness requirement, an issue
to which we return below. 178 In any event, it ignores the fact that
this application of the Chevron doctrine turned lenity on its head.
To summarize, O'Hagan illustrates an expansive model of
statutory interpretation in criminal cases. Contributing to the
decision were factors such as: a history of aggressive litigation
176. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672-73 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).

177. Id. at 666 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78fl(a)).
178. See infra Part II.B.
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by the SEC, a similar history of aggressive positions by the
Department of Justice, scholarly work supporting the positions of
the SEC and the Department of Justice, the Chevron doctrine, and
private civil litigation brought under the statute. Some of these
179
factors are doctrinal, some institutional, and some idiosyncratic.
It is this combination that drives the interpretation of these
statutes to a far greater extent than the canons of construction on
which the courts purport to rely.
2. Antitrust Laws
The enforcement history of the antitrust laws is far too complex
to encapsulate within any of the four models discussed in this
Article. The institutional roles are both complicated and somewhat
unique as a matter of administrative law. As Spencer Waller
describes in his article on the institutional arrangements involved
in antitrust enforcement, the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice, which has jurisdiction over both criminal and civil
antitrust cases, early in its history focused on its role as a law
enforcement agency.18 0 The Division took aggressive positions in
criminal prosecutions, and the courts went along. As a consequence,
it would not be surprising to see a kind of "reverse inflation," in
which criminal cases expand doctrine to be followed later in civil
cases.
In fact, this inflationary dynamic has occurred. In 1940, the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,I's
in which a group of oil companies had agreed to buy surplus oil on
the spot market to prevent prices from falling.18 The question was
whether this agreement was a per se violation of the Sherman Act
as a form of price fixing, even though no particular prices were
established.1 83 At the time, broadening the definition of "agreement"
179. As William Wang has pointed out to me in personal communication, both Carpenter
and O'Haganfurther illustrate how aggressively the courts have been willing to interpret the
mail fraud statute in criminal cases. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.

180. Waller, supra note 26, at 1391-94. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction
only in civil cases, and has not influenced antitrust doctrine as much as, say, the SEC has
influenced securities law doctrine.
181. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
182. Id. at 166.
183. Id. at 224-25.
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was seen as an expansion of antitrust liability.'8 Some forty years
later, in Catalano,Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. ,' the Court relied on
Socony-Vacuum when it held that an agreement between beer
wholesalers not to supply credit to retailers buying their product
was a per se violation. 86 By withdrawing the credit terms they had
previously extended, the wholesalers essentially raised the present
value of each transaction. The Court found this187sufficient to
constitute price fixing, a per se violation of the law.
Perhaps this interpretive history would have unfolded differently
had the Antitrust Division not enjoyed the prestige it did in 1940
under Thurmond Arnold.' Notwithstanding this idiosyncracy, it
still resembles the inflationary history of the securities laws in an
important respect: In both instances, aggressive enforcement efforts
by institutions empowered to enforce the relevant statute led the
way. In the securities law context, it was the SEC and the
Department ofJustice working in tandem. In the antitrust area, the
Justice Department played both roles. Moreover, it is not difficult
to find examples of statutory inflation in the antitrust context in
which the expansive interpretation began in a civil case.
In United States v. Nippon PaperIndustries Co.,"89 the district
court dismissed a prosecution against Nippon on the ground that all
of the alleged illegal activity had occurred outside the United
States. 190 The traditional rule is that statutes are not interpreted to

regulate conduct extraterritorially. But in earlier cases, including
a 1993 Supreme Court decision,'' courts had determined that the
Sherman Act may be so construed in civil cases, where violations of
the Act have significant ramifications within the United States.
This, the First Circuit concluded, established a definitive interpretation of the Sherman Act, which should be applied universally
to civil and criminal cases alike.' 92 It therefore reversed the district
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 224 n.59.
446 U.S. 643 (1980).
Id. at 648-49.
Id. at 650. For further discussion of this body of law, see LEONARD ORLAND,

CORPORATE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (forthcoming).

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Waller, supra note 26, at 1391-94.
944 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1996).
Id. at 66.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
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the matter
court and reinstated the case.19 Having decided that
194
was clear cut, it rejected Nippon's lenity argument.
The court's reasoning in Nippon is not terribly convincing. The
operative facts occurred in 1990,' three years before the Supreme
Court endorsed extraterritoriality in civil antitrust actions. Thus,
the district court failed to address the serious question of whether
Nippon was on adequate notice of the legal standards that would
apply when it had choices to make about its business conduct. The
more entrenched a broad statutory interpretation becomes as the
result of interpretation in an earlier civil case, however, the less
natural it would seem to interpret that statute narrowly in a subsequent criminal case. Once a statutory term has been construed,
even if the construction occurred in the context of a civil case, that
part of the context in which
construction inevitably becomes 196
subsequent interpretations occur.
Ultimately, the strength of the Nippon opinion depends on how
entrenched extraterritorial interpretation of the antitrust laws was
at the time that the violations occurred. If opinions in civil cases
had clearly established that courts would apply the antitrust laws
extraterritorially in cases like Nippon, then it is hard to see what
role lenity should play. If, in contrast, the issue was not firmly
resolved until the Supreme Court's 1993 decision, as the First
Circuit seemed to imply, then Nippon was wrongly decided.
Whatever the right decision in Nippon, it is possible, as a general
matter, to articulate a set of circumstances in which earlier broad
interpretations in civil decisions carry the day in later criminal
ones. The predictable result is the ironic expansion of criminal law
over time, even in a system that applies lenity. The developments
in the securities and antitrust laws illustrate how this can happen.

522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
193. Nippon, 109 F.3d at 9.
194. Id. at 7-8.
195. Id. at 2.
196. This has been observed by many who focus on the role of context in judicial
interpretation. See, e.g., DWORtKN, supra note 14, at 337; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation,71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
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3. EnvironmentalLaw
A third area in which we see broad statutory interpretation in
both civil and criminal cases is environmental law, especially cases
interpreting the Clean Water Act. Here, broad interpretation in
criminal cases seems to be part of the design of the statutory
scheme. One device, to which we will return in Part II, is the use of
lax mens rea standards. For example, a provision of the Clean
Water Act criminalizes negligent discharge of oil into navigable
waters of the United States. 197 In one case, an individual who
negligently ruptured an oil pipe while driving a backhoe was
convicted and sentenced to six months in prison, a result affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit.198
Combining a lax mens rea requirement with the Chevron doctrine
and broad statutory language ensures broad interpretation of
environmental laws. To illustrate, consider United States v.
Mango.'9 9 Louise Mango and others were indicted for violating the
Clean Water Act in connection with a pipeline project between
Ontario, Canada and Long Island, New York.' Iroquois, a company
in which the defendants were involved, had applied to the Army
Corps of Engineers and received a permit for the project, as
required by law. 20' Attached to the permit were a series of
conditions, including wetland construction and mitigation procedures, as well as erosion control. 2 2 In constructing the project,
the defendants failed to abide by those conditions.20 3
The statute authorizes the Secretary of the Army, through the
Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers, to issue permits for dredging
and filling waterways and wetlands. 2 4 A regulation permits district
197. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(cX1XA) (2000).

198. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999).
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

199 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). The statute reads:
Permits for dredged or fill material
(a) Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites.
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters
at specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the date an
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engineers and their designees to exercise this authority on behalf
of the Chief.2" 5 The first issue, decided under the Chevron doctrine,
was whether this delegation violated the statute. The second issue,
also decided under Chevron, concerned the substance of the permit.
The statute authorizes the issuance of permits "for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites."0 6 Some of the conditions that were imposed in the
permit related "indirectly" to protecting the waterways from the
effects of the discharge of dredged or fill material. The question was
how closely related the permit had to be to its statutorily authorized
purpose.
The district court dismissed most of the indictment.0 7 Applying
the Chevron doctrine, the Second Circuit afforded much greater
deference to the Army Corps of Engineers. Determining that the
statute permitted delegation from the Chief to district-engineers
and their designees under Chevron, the court deferred to the
agency's interpretation of its authority as reasonable. 0 8 The court
also deferred to the agency concerning the substance of the permit:
"The CWA is reasonably interpreted to allow the Secretary to
consider the cumulative effect of a discharge on an entire ecosystem
rather than confining him to consideration of the effects of the
permitted discharge on the river into which it is discharged."0 9 As
the record was not adequate to judge the permit even under this
deferential standard, the court remanded the case to the district
court for further analysis.210

applicant submits all the information required to complete an application for
a permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall publish the notice required
by this subsection.
Id.
205. 33 C.F.R. § 325.8(b) (2002). The regulation reads in part:
District engineers are authorized to issue or deny permits in accordance with
these regulations.... It is essential to the legality of a permit that it contain the
name of the district engineer as the issuing officer. However, the permit need
not be signed by the district engineer in person but may be signed for and in
behalf of him by whomever he designates.
Id.
206. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
207. United States v. Mango, 997 F. Supp. 264 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
208. Mango, 199 F.3d at 91-92.
209. Id. at 93.
210. Id. at 94.
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I do not argue here that this decision is unjustifiable, but that it
was unquestionably aggressive. The Clean Water Act authorizes the
Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for "the
discharge of dredged or fill material" and makes it a crime to violate
the conditions of any such permit. 1 Here, criminal charges were
brought, and by and large upheld, for violation of a permit that
contained conditions indirectly related to any such discharge. This
is indeed a broad interpretation.
Taken together, the environmental cases illustrate a great deal
about what drives the inflationary model. First, they demonstrate
that statutory inflation can be an effective tool for combating
harmful conduct in a rapidly changing sector of society. The
combination of lax mens rea requirements and the Chevron doctrine
makes it easier to obtain convictions. Second, successful prosecutions in such cases imply that when Congress does not wish to
trigger the inflationary model, it can reduce inflationary pressure
by imposing more onerous state of mind requirements. Third, the
heavy reliance on the Chevron doctrine suggests that we should see
less inflationary interpretation when agencies are not involved.
This should be true because there are no agency lawyers exploring
the outer limits of the agency's statutory authority to regulate and
building close working relationships with Justice Department
lawyers, and because there are no agency interpretations to which
courts may defer. Instead, courts must resort to such principles as
legislative intent and the rule of lenity.
C. The Lenity Model
The rule of lenity has traditionally been applied only in criminal
cases. As early as 1805, Chief Justice Marshall pronounced in
United States v. Fisher 12 that the principle of strict construction
should not apply to regulatory statutes, but only to those in which
fundamental rights are at issue.2 1 Fisherinvolved a dispute over
the meaning of the bankruptcy laws, and the Court refused to
construe the law narrowly. The lenity model, which calls for a
211. The statute imposes a maximum sentence of one year in prison for negligent violation
of permit conditions, and three years for knowing violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000). The
Mango indictment contained thirty-one counts. Mango, 199 F.3d at 86.

212. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
213. Id. at 389-90.
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narrow construction in both civil and criminal cases, is somewhat
at odds with the American legal tradition, and we should not expect
courts to use it frequently.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has articulated, on occasion,
support for a unified, narrow approach to interpretation of a given
statute. For example, in FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.,214
the Court rejected the FCC's broad construction of a statute
prohibiting the broadcasting of lotteries to ban certain "give-aways"
on radio and television.2 15 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice
Warren stated: "There cannot be one construction for the Federal
Communications Commission and another for the Department of
Justice. If we should give [the Act] the broad construction... [that]
would likewise apply in criminal cases ... it would do violence to the
well-established principle that penal statutes are to be construed
"
strictly. 216

More recently, the Court has applied the rule of lenity in two civil
cases precisely because the statutes in dispute involved statutes
with criminal remedies.2 17 In Crandon v. United States, 218 the
Justice Department had brought a civil action against former
Reagan Administration employees to recover lump sum payments
made to them by their former private sector employers upon their
resignations to enter government service.2" 9 The payments were
"intended to mitigate the substantial financial loss each employee
expected to suffer by reason of his change in employment."220
Relying on common law principles, the government brought an
action under § 209(a) of the Criminal Code,2 2 ' which does not itself
214. 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
215. Id. at 292.

216. Id. at 296.
217. For discussion of these cases, and general discussion of the rule of lenity, see Bruce
A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of Cognate Civil and
Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L.J. 335 (1994). Markell argues that criminal and civil

considerations are sufficiently diverse, at least in the bankruptcy context, and that courts
should not apply the rule of lenity in civil cases.
218. 494 U.S. 152 (1990).
219. Id. at 154.
220. Id.
221. 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (2000). The statute reads:
Whoever receives any salary, or any contribution to or supplementation of
salary, as compensation for his services as an officer or employee of the

executive branch of the United States government ... from any source other
than the Government ofthe United States, ... [sihall be subject to the penalties
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authorize civil actions. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court
held that "because the governing standard is set forth in a criminal
statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any
ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage."222 It found the
statute unclear with respect to the payment of a lump sum prior to
the commencement of government employment. The opinion focused
on the need to ensure adequate notice and to avoid common law
crimes."
In UnitedStates v. Thompson / CenterArms Co. ,224 the Court took
the same approach, applying the rule of lenity in a tax case. 2' The
National Firearms Act levied a tax of $200 on manufacturers for
each "firearm" that the manufacturer made.2 Under the statute,
short-barreled rifles are firearms; pistols and long-barreled rifles
are not. Thompson/Center Arms sold a pistol packaged with a
conversion kit that allowed the purchaser to convert it into either
a long-barreled rifle or a short-barreled rifle.227 The issue was
whether the pistol with the kit constituted a "firearm" subject to the
$200 tax. After finding the statute ambiguous, Justice Souter wrote
in a plurality opinion:
After applying the ordinary rules of statutory construction, then,
we are left with an ambiguous statute. The key to resolving the
ambiguity lies in recognizing that although it is a tax statute
that we construe now in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal
applications that carry no additional requirement of willfulness.
Cf. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991) ("Congress
has ... softened the impact of the common-law presumption [that
ignorance of the law is no defense to criminal prosecution] by
making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain

federal criminal tax offenses"); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203
(criminalizing willful evasion of taxes and willful failure to file
a return). Making a firearm without approval may be subject to
criminal sanction, as is possession of an unregistered firearm
set forth in section 216 of this title.

Id.
222. Crandon,494 U.S. at 158.

223. Id.
224. 504 U.S. 505 (1992).

225. Id. at 517-18.
226. 26 U.S.C. § 5849 (2000).
227. Thompson, 504 U.S. at 508.
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and failure to pay the tax on one, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5871. It is
proper, therefore, to apply the rule of lenity and resolve the
ambiguity in Thompson/Center's favor. See Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990) (applying lenity in interpreting
a criminal statute invoked in a civil action); Commissioner v.
Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91 (1959). Accordingly, we conclude that the
Contender pistol and carbine kit when packaged together by
Thompson/Center have not been
"made" into a short-barreled
228
rifle for purposes of the NFA.
This time, Justice Stevens dissented:
The plurality, after acknowledging that this case involves "a tax
statute" and its construction "in a civil setting," nevertheless
proceeds to treat the case as though it were a criminal
prosecution. In my view, the Court should approach this case
like any other civil case testing the Government's interpretation
of an important regulatory statute. This statute serves the
critical objective of regulating the manufacture and distribution
of concealable firearms-dangerous weapons that are a leading
cause of countless crimes that occur every day throughout the
Nation. This is a field that has long been subject to pervasive
governmental regulation because of the dangerous nature of the
product and the public interest in having that danger controlled.
The public interest in carrying out the purposes that motivated
the enactment of this statute is, in my judgment and on this
record, far more compelling than a mechanical application of the
rule of lenity.229
Note the dynamic in light of the models I propose in this Article.
The plurality employs the lenity model in order to fight statutory
inflation. In so doing, it relies on Cheek v. United States, 230 in which
the Court held that tax evasion requires proof that the defendant
knew he was violating the law. 231' But Cheek does not employ the
lenity model, as the plurality implies. It employs the standard
model: the tax code can be interpreted broadly in civil cases, but
criminal activity will only be found in the most clear cut violations
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 517-18 (parallel citations omitted).
Id. at 526 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
498 U.S. 192 (1991).
Id. at 199-204.
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of the law. Justice Stevens' dissent, in contrast, seems willing to
accept the risk of statutory inflation in subsequent cases. As there
was no risk of criminal sanctions to Thompson/Center Arms
Company, and because the Supreme Court decision provides fair
notice, lenity is no longer a consideration.
D. The Law Enforcement Model
I have found no instances in which a court interprets the same
language broadly in criminal cases, and more narrowly in civil
ones.232 Because lenity is such a deeply entrenched value in our
system of justice, one would expect narrow construction in civil
cases to lead to statutory deflation in criminal ones. Nonetheless,
examination of a few RICO doctrines suggests that the courts have
been generous with prosecutors and stingy with civil plaintiffs in
interpreting various provisions of the statute. This judicial
perspective is consistent with the view that RICO is principally a
criminal statute with civil remedies tacked on.2"' In these
circumstances, a court might wish to interpret narrowly those
provisions that appear to be used by civil litigants, while giving
prosecutors broad latitude to fight crime. I will illustrate this
phenomenon, and point out deflationary pressures that accompany
this tactic.

232. Arguably, the Supreme Court has been generous with the government and stingy
with private plaintiffs bringing claims under the securities statutes. Over the past several
decades, a number of cases have reduced access to the courts in civil cases by private
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164 (1994) (finding no liability for aiders and abettors in private action); Blue Chip
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs must be actual sellers or
purchasers). But the record on this issue is by no means uniform. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988) (relaxing requirements for proof of reliance in private actions); Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) (limiting in pari delicto defense,
thus expanding potential scope of liability).
233. In fact, its legislative history suggests that RICO is just that. See Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1084-87 (9th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court recently declined
to rule on the power of district courts to grant injunctive relief to private plaintiffs under §
1964(c). See Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057 (2003).
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1. Mail Fraudas a RICO PredicateAct
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO)23 makes it illegal to use an "enterprise" to engage in
"a pattern of racketeering activity," among other things. 2
"Racketeering activities" are listed in a glossary, and include both
violent crimes such as murder and arson, and crimes of dishonesty,
including wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud."' A"'pattern
of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity" within a ten year period.2"'
Although RICO is principally a criminal statute, it also contains
a provision that permits those injured by RICO violators to recover
treble damages plus attorneys' fees.238 Other than through RICO,
there is no private right of action for violation of the federal mail
fraud2 9 and wire fraud 240 statutes. RICO, therefore, quickly became
a fantastic opportunity for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring mail and
wire fraud claims in federal court which otherwise would have to be
prosecuted in state courts as statutory or common law torts. At the
same time, plaintiffs could seek treble damages and attorneys' fees.
Because mail fraud is a statutory predicate act, and because
plaintiffs generally plead more than one mailing in connection with
a fraud, the crucial issue in RICO cases based on mail fraud is
whether the mailings form a pattern. In H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co.,241 the Supreme Court held that a pattern
requires both a relationship among the predicate acts and
continuity from one to another, an easy standard to meet in
many cases.24 2 According to the Court in H.J., Inc., the pattern
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
235. Id. § 1962(a).
236. Id. § 1961(1).

237. Id. § 1961(5).
238. Id. § 1964.
239. Id. § 1341. Courts have held for decades that no private right of action exists under
the mail fraud statute. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177-79 (6th Cir.
1979).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000). Courts have similarly held that no private right of action
exists under the wire fraud statute. See, e.g., Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford
& Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974).
241. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
242. Id. at 239. The Court had spoken in similar terms four years earlier. See Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479,497 n.14 (1985).
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requirement is met when a defendant uses exactly the same type of
scheme to defraud multiple plaintiffs.243 The question the Court did
not address is whether multiple mailings in connection with a
single fraud is a sufficient basis for liability.
In case after case, district courts and courts of appeals have
found that multiple mailings in furtherance of "a single scheme to
inflict a single injury on a single victim" does not constitute a RICO
pattern.2 44 As the Seventh Circuit explained:
Virtually every garden-variety fraud is accomplished through a

series of wire or mail fraud acts that are "related" by purpose
and spread over a period of at least several months. Where such
a fraudulent scheme inflicts or threatens only a single injury, we
continue to doubt that Congress intended to make the
availability of treble damages and augmented criminal sanctions

dependent solely on whether the fraudulent scheme is well
enough conceived to enjoy prompt
success or requires pursuit for
24
an extended period of time.

Moreover, virtually all of the cases in which this situation arises are
civil ones. There is really no need for a federal prosecutor to take on
the burden of proving all the elements of RICO in a case involving
only multiple acts of mail and wire fraud. An indictment for the
underlying crimes alone can lead to a lengthy prison sentence.
Perhaps the courts are right to limit RICO in this way, but their
holdings are not easy to justify as a straightforward analytical
matter. As we have seen, the Court has defined "pattern" as
requiring only that acts be both related and sequential. Surely
multiple mailings in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme meet that
requirement and, as we will see below, courts have been very

generous to prosecutors in interpreting the mail fraud statute. It is
the contrast between the civil RICO decisions on the one hand, and
the underlying doctrines, developed largely in the context of
243. H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.

244. Tudor Assoc., Ltd. v. AJ & AJ Servicing, Inc., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 26175, at *12
(4th Cir. 1994); see also Trundy v. Strumsky, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 23228 (1st Cir. 1992);

Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406 (3d Cir. 1991); Marshall-Silver Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990).
245. United States Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 911 F.2d 1261, 1268 (7th
Cir. 1990).
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criminal law, on the other, that puts these cases into the law
enforcement model of statutory interpretation.
2. CriminalMail Fraudand CriminalRICO
Consider the leading mail fraud case, Schmuck v. United
States.2" The mail fraud statute makes it a crime to use the mail
for the purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme.247 Wayne T.
Schmuck indeed was involved in a fraudulent scheme: He
purchased automobiles, set back the odometers, and resold them to
car dealers, who would in turn sell the cars.248 Only after Schmuck
had reaped the benefit of his fraudulent scheme did a mailing occur.
As Justice Blackmun explained:
To complete the resale of each automobile, the dealer who
purchased it from Schmuck would submit a title-application
form to the Wisconsin Department of Transportation on behalf
of his retail customer. The receipt of a Wisconsin title was a
prerequisite for completing the resale; without it, the dealer
could not transfer title to the customer and the customer
could not obtain Wisconsin tags. The submission of the titleapplication form supplied the mailing element of each of the
alleged mail frauds.249
The question was whether this scheme met the statute's requirement that the mailing be in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme. Schmuck argued that the fraud was complete by the time
the mailing occurred. 50
246. 489 U.S. 705 (1989).

247. At the time the case was decided, the statute read in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to

defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises ... for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do ...knowingly causes to be delivered by
mail ... according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed
to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. at 710 n.6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341).
248. Id. at 707.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 711.
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The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the conviction
reasoning that "[a] rational jury could have concluded that the
success of Schmuck's venture depended upon his continued
harmonious relations with, and good reputation among retail
dealers, which in turn required the smooth flow of cars from the
dealers to their Wisconsin customers."2 5 ' Justice Scalia dissented:
[I]t is mail fraud, not mail and fraud, that incurs liability. This
federal statute is not violated by a fraudulent scheme in which,
at some point, a mailing happens to occur-nor even by one in
which a mailing predictably and necessarily occurs. The mailing
must be in furtherance of the fraud.252
Schmuck is an instance of expansive interpretation of a criminal
statute. Not only was lenity not a consideration, but the mail fraud
statute was interpreted as broadly as "a rational jury" would take
it. The jurisprudence of statutory interpretation does not ordinarily
leave such decisions in the jury's hands.25
The Court's interpretations of the mail and wire fraud statutes
in the Carpenter and O'Hagan securities fraud cases discussed
earlier were nearly as aggressive. Carpenterinvolved a financial
journalist's sale of information to brokers that was about to appear
in his Wall Street Journalcolumn. The Supreme Court rejected his
argument that the information did not constitute property, as
required by the mail fraud statute. It further rejected the same
argument that Schmuck made-that the fraud was over by the time
any mailing occurred in connection with the column's subsequent
publication." 4 In O'Hagan, although there was considerable controversy about the securities fraud convictions, the Court had little
trouble affirming convictions for mail fraud, relying heavily on
2 55 Even if these holdings
Carpenter.
were reasonable under the
circumstances, they are undeniably broad readings of the statute.

251. Id. at 711-12.
252. Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. But see Darryl K Brown, Plain Meaning,PracticalReason and Culpability:Toward
a Theory of Jury Interpretationof CriminalStatutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
254. United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987).
255. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 700-01 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
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Especially striking is the contrast between these casesespecially Schmuck-and the civil RICO cases discussed above.
Given the broad sweep of the mail fraud statute in criminal cases,
there can be little doubt that it should cover the "garden-variety
fraud" that the courts have held are not covered by RICO. Similarly,
given the definition of "pattern" in H.J., Inc., it seems relatively
clear that the mailings in the civil RICO cases form a pattern. The
courts have made it easy for federal prosecutors to use the mail
fraud statute to obtain federal jurisdiction over "garden-variety
frauds," but extremely difficult for plaintiffs to use the mail fraud
statute to sue for treble damages over those same "garden-variety
frauds." It is for this reason that these cases, taken together,
embody the law enforcement model of statutory interpretation. The
cases are all the more dramatic in light of the fact that, at the time
it decided H.J., Inc., the Supreme Court had interpreted RICO
broadly more often than not in both criminal and civil cases. 2 m
II. CONTROLLING STATUTORY INFLATION
A. How Much Should Statutory Inflation Be Controlled?
When we speak of "controlling" monetary inflation, we generally
mean keeping it to a minimum. Here, however, I use the word in a
weaker sense to mean "to regulate," the way a good ventilation
system controls temperature in a building. Statutory inflation
should not be regarded negatively in all cases. To the contrary, it
is one means by which the legal system responds to new ways
of disobeying social norms. Inflation can be seen as a form 25of7
what William Eskridge calls "dynamic statutory interpretation."
Professor Rubin has suggested recently that dynamic statutory
interpretation is a natural by-product of the administrative state,5 8
a conclusion consistent with the findings of this Article that
256. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Russello v. United

States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
257. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 23; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987). For recent discussion of Eskridge's theory of
dynamic statutory interpretation, including his most recent thoughts, see Symposium,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, DYNAMIC STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION (2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3 (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
258. See Rubin, supra note 23.
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statutory inflation occurs largely when agencies and law enforcement bureaus pressure courts over time for more expansive
readings of statutes. The question thus contextualized is how
dynamically criminal statutes should be interpreted.
In advocating for dynamism in the interpretation of statutes,
Eskridge focuses largely on the civil rights laws and other civil
statutes. Both his article and book by the same title barely mention
criminal law. Similarly, Guido Calabresi's book,A Common Law for
the Age ofStatutes,which argues that courts should update statutes
as they become obsolete, spends little time dealing with crimes.25 9
This should not be surprising. The federal courts rejected the notion
260
of common law crimes early in American judicial history.

Although lenity, as we have seen, is certainly not applied across the
board, it offends due process values to give courts too much leeway
in expanding the scope of a criminal statute without the fair notice
that a duly-enacted statute brings.
However, there seem to be circumstances in which the dynamic
interpretation of criminal statutes does not offend the values of
legislative primacy or fair play.2 1' The most obvious cases are ones
in which the legislature uses broad words in the statute. When
Congress writes a statute outlawing the use of fraudulent devices,
for example, we are not offended when the law is applied to
fraudulent schemes that were concocted after the statute was
enacted, so long as it is clear at the time of the prosecution that
they are indeed fraudulent.2 62 The criminalization of insider
trading, decades after it was deemed to be a violation of the
securities laws, provides one illustration.2 63 The prosecution of
fraud over the Internet provides another.

259. See CALABRESI, supra note 23.
260. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); Gary D. Rowe,
Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian
Ascendancy, and the Abolition of FederalCommon Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919 (1992).
261. For a more detailed discussion, see Lawrence M. Solan, Should CriminalStatutes be
Interpreted Dynamically?, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, DYNAMIc

STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION (2002): Article 8, at http//www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art8 (last visited Apr.
5, 2003).
262. See Kahan, supra note 68 (arguing that such statutes constitute delegation of
legislative power to the courts-a kind of common law of criminal jurisprudence).
263. See supra Part I.B. 1.
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Nor are we offended when courts deflate the scope of criminal
statutes whose scope once could be justified by social norms, but
which now are obsolete in various potential applications. For
example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held three
decades ago that a statute banning "any unnatural or lascivious act
with another person " 21 4 should apply to criminalize only acts that
are nonconsensual or performed in public.265 At the time it issued
this decision, there were doubts about the constitutionality of the
statute under the Supreme Court's privacyjurisprudence. Recently,
the Massachusetts high court held that the state's sodomy statute
should be similarly construed,266 although state sodomy laws had
been held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court after the
Massachusetts court's earlier "lascivious act" decision. 26 7 Thus,
there was no impetus from the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the federal Constitution for the Supreme Judicial Court's view
regarding sodomy. The court has construed the sodomy statute
dynamically so that it conforms more with today's social norms than
with those of nineteenth century society, when it was enacted.
Nonetheless, some of the examples of statutory inflation
presented in this Article do raise concerns about both legislative
primacy and due process. For one thing, whether statutory inflation
is likely to occur depends largely on the institutional choices
that the legislature makes in establishing the statutory scheme.
Typically, however, there is no evidence that the legislature is
aware when it enacts statutes that these choices will govern which
canons of statutory construction courts will apply decades later to
resolve disputes over the statute's scope. With respect to federal
statutes, Congress can attempt to regain control of the legislative
process by doing in advance what courts do later: It can control
statutory inflation, as part of the legislative process, either by
specifying the mens rea requirement for prosecutions, or by actually
including rules of construction in the statute itself. A recent article
by Nicholas Rosenkranz proposes that Congress use the latter

264. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 35 (2000 & Supp. 2002).

265. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1974).
266. Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders v. Attorney General, 763 N.E.2d 38 (Mass.
2002).
267. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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approach more generally as part of the legislative process.26 I argue
below, however, that the former approach is far more likely to be
successful.
As for due process concerns, they arise when a court breaks new
ground by interpreting a statute or regulation broadly for the first
time in the context of a prosecution. That was true of some of the
older antitrust cases that influenced later doctrine in civil cases.269
Currently, due process concerns arise when courts apply the
Chevron doctrine aggressively to uphold prosecutions for regulatory
violations before the validity of the regulation has been firmly
established. O'Hagan illustrates the phenomenon. I suggest below
that courts should not apply the Chevron doctrine in criminal cases
unless (1) the regulation has already been upheld in a civil case, (2)
the conduct in question is clearly illegal based on civil cases
interpreting the statute itself, or (3) the statute's language is clear.
B. Imposing Strong Mens Rea Requirements
One way the legislature can influence the degree of statutory
inflation is by regulating the mens rea required for a conviction
in a criminal case. When the statute requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of the law and
knew his conduct was prohibited, it will be very difficult for the
government to prosecute any case other than those in which
illegality is obvious. Those cases, in turn, are precisely the cases
that would be permitted if the rule of lenity were to apply. Thus, a
heightened state of mind requirement helps to simulate the
standard model of interpretation of dual-remedy statutes. Other
states of mind, ranging from knowledge that the act was wrongful
to simple negligence, will permit prosecution of more marginal
violations of the statute, and therefore will control inflation less.
Many dual-remedy statutes permit prosecution only of "willful"
violations of statutes or regulations. Courts, however, do not
treat the word "willful" uniformly, and Congress often does not
adequately specify the state of mind required for a criminal
268. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, FederalRules ofStatutory Interpretation,115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085 (2002).
269. See supraPart I.B.2.
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violation to occur. Consider Cheek v. United States, ° which
interpreted the statute governing tax evasion.27 1 The tax laws have
a long history of requiring specific intent in order for nonpayment
to constitute a crime. Consistent with this history, the Court held:
"Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax
cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a
duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and
that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty."2 72 As we
saw earlier, the same elevated level of mens rea is generally conan element of criminal cases brought under the Copyright
sidered
3
Act.

27

The willfulness requirement in the securities laws,274 in contrast,
has been interpreted more leniently toward the government.
Conscious of the due process concerns that its opinion raises, the
O'Hagan Court held specifically that "a defendant may not be
imprisoned for violating Rule 10b-5 if he proves that he had no
knowledge of the Rule."275 Yet that requirement does little to help
defendants who are convicted as a result of the application of the
Chevron doctrine, or those who are aware of the rule, but not of
its inflationary application to new circumstances. The holding in
O'Hagan, then, although resembling that in Cheek, is weaker in
significant respects, and therefore should allow a somewhat broader
array of prosecutions.
The Supreme Court has also construed the antitrust laws to
require a heightened state of intent in criminal cases. In United
States v. UnitedStates Gypsum Co.,276 the Court held that criminal
2 77
violations of the Sherman Act require proof of a specific mens rea
The government accused gypsum board manufacturers of conspiring
270. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).

271. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000). The statute states that any person "who willfully attempts
in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof" shall
be punished. Id. The Court in Cheek also interpreted § 7203, which defines willful failure to
file a tax return as a misdemeanor. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 192.

272. Id. at 201.
273. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing mens rea requirement of
the Copyright Act); see also United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-51 (D. Neb.
1991) (presenting the interpretation of"willful" that prevails in federal courts)

274. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(2000).
275. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665-66 (1997).
276. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
277. Id. at 438.
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to fix prices when it learned that they had been verifying their
prices with each other, largely by telephone. 278 The jury charge
instructed in part that "if the effect of the exchanges of pricing
information was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then
the parties to them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have
intended that result."27 9
United States Gypsum and others were convicted, but the Third
Circuit reversed on appeal. 2 0 The Supreme Court affirmed the
reversal. 2 ' Recognizing that the Sherman Act, "unlike most
traditional criminal statutes, does not, in clear and categorical
terms, precisely identify the conduct which it proscribes,"2 2 the
Court applied lenity, and imposed the traditional rule of mens rea
on criminal enforcement of the antitrust laws: "Our analysis focuses
solely on the elements of a criminal offense under the antitrust
laws, and leaves unchanged the general rule that a civil violation
can be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an
anticompetitive effect." 3
The Court in United States Gypsum did not go so far as to require
the defendant to be aware of the specific provisions of the antitrust
laws, and to violate them despite such knowledge. This decision,
then, leaves more room for prosecution of antitrust cases than
for tax fraud cases under the more difficult standard articulated
in Cheek." 4 The contrast between the two standards raises the
possibility of a significant legislative opportunity. By fine-tuning
the state of mind requirements, legislatures can exercise considerable control over statutory inflation, allowing it differentially as
a matter of policy. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court,
however, has settled on a uniform vocabulary for expressing these
small differences in proof, leaving the law governing
state of mind
2 s5
state.
muddled
somewhat
a
in
requirements

278. Id. at 427-28.
279. Id. at 434.

280. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
281. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 465.
282. Id. at 438.
283. Id. at 436 n.13.

284. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
285. For discussion of some of the problems in this area of law, see Kenneth W. Simons,
Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 464-66 (1992).
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For example, a number of statutes provide criminal sanctions for
"knowing" violations of the law. "Knowing" seems on its face to be
an easier standard for the government to meet than "willful." Yet
in some cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted such statutes to
mean that the defendant must know the rules and that he was
violating them. In Liparota v. United States,8 6 the Court applied
the rule of lenity to interpret a statute making it illegal to
knowingly transfer food stamps in violation of the law. 28 7 The Court
held that the statute is ambiguous as to whether the illegality of
the sale comes within the scope of "knowingly." 8 The Supreme
Court ruled similarly in Ratzlaf v. United States,289 interpreting a
statute making it a crime to "willfully" evade currency structuring
laws.2 90
In Bryan v. United States, 1 however, the Court interpreted
"willfully" more flexibly: "As a general matter, when used in the
criminal context, a 'willful' act is one undertaken with a 'bad
purpose.' In other words, in order to establish a 'willful' violation of
a statute, 'the Government must prove that the defendant acted
with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."29 2
The statute at issue in Bryan was the Firearms Owners'
Protection Act, which requires a federal license to deal in firearms. 29' The Act added a scienter requirement to a preexisting law.
Under the revised Act willful violators are subject to criminal
penalties.29 4 In Bryan, circumstantial evidence suggested that the
defendant was aware that his commerce in firearms was wrongful,
but there was no proof that he was aware of the particular licensing
requirements that he was accused of violating. 29 5 Syntactically, the
statutes interpreted in Liparotaand Ratzlafare very similar to that
286. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).

287. Id. at 427. The statute, simplified for purposes of exposition, reads: "Whoever
knowingly ... transfers ... [food stamps] in any manner contrary to this chapter or the

regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall ... [be punished]." 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1)
(2000).
288. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424.
289. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
290. Id. at 136-37.
291. 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
292. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (2000).
294. Id. § 924(aX1XD).
295. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 189.
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in Bryan. Bryan, in turn imposed a stronger mens rea requirement
than the Court had earlier required for a related statute. In 1994,
four years before its decision in Bryan, the Court had held that
the National Firearms Act 296 contains a mens rea requirement,
although not expressly stated in the Act.29 7 That statute imposes a
tax on statutorily-defined "firearms" and makes it a crime to own
such a weapon without registering it and paying the tax.298 In
Staples v. United States, 99 the Court held that it would be unfair
to assume that Congress would impose such harsh penalties (a
maximum of ten years in prison) without proof that the defendant
was aware of the features of the firearm that would bring it within
the statute.3 0 0 The Court held that "to obtain a conviction, the
Government should have been required to prove that petitioner
knew of the features of his AR-15 that brought it within the scope
of the Act."3 'OProfessor Joseph Kennedy has argued that many of
the Court's recent mens rea decisions appear to be reactions to the
than an
severity of the punishment contained in the statute, rather
302
analysis of the language Congress used or failed to use.
Environmental laws present perhaps the most interesting cases
in which state of mind requirements have been a significant
issue in the construction of dual-remedy statutes. Defendants in
environmental crimes cases have routinely asked courts to apply
lenity on the model of Liparota.To date, the courts of appeals have
interpreted this mens rea requirement narrowly, and, therefore,
have interpreted the statute broadly. For example, in United States
v. Kelley Technical Coatings,Inc.,"' the defendants were charged
with storing and disposing of hazardous waste without a permit, in
violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.30 4 The Act

296. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (2000). The National Firearms Act is the same statute to
which the Court applied lenity in UnitedStates v. Thompson/ Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505
(1992), a civil tax case; see supranote 20 and accompanying text.

297. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994).
298. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801(a), 5861 (2000).
299. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).

300. Id. at 616.
301. Id. at 619.
302. Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime FitthePunishment,51 EMORYL.J. 753,757-58

(2002).
303. 157 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 1998).
304. Id. at 432.
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imposes criminal sanctions against a person who "knowingly treats,
stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed
without a permit ..... ' The Sixth Circuit held that knowledge of the
an element of the crime. 3 ' Other courts have ruled
law was not
07
similarly.
The lax mens rea requirements in environmental crime cases
follow from the "public welfare offense" doctrine that the Supreme
Court carved out in United States v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp. 8 The doctrine reduces, the mens rea requirement
for violations of statutes regulating the movement of dangerous
materials. 0 9 InternationalMinerals involved the knowing transportation of sulfuric acid by a shipper without adequate disclosure,
in contravention of Department of Transportation regulations.3 10
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, concluded that issues of
notice are greatly reduced when a defendant is accused of dealing
with hazardous substances that are heavily regulated:
In Balint the Court was dealing with drugs, in Freedwith hand
grenades, in this case with sulfuric and other dangerous acids.
Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. But they
may be the type of products which might raise substantial due
process questions if Congress did not require, as in Murdock,
"mens rea" as to each ingredient of the offense. But where, as
here and as in Balint and Freed, dangerous or deleterious
devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved,
the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is
aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them
must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. 1'

305. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(dX2XA) (2000).
306. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d at 438-40.
307. See, e.g., United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that knowledge of illegality is not required for conviction for knowingly violating provisions

of the Clean Water Act). This is not to say that courts never apply the rule of lenity in cases
involving criminal application of environmental statutes. For example, in United States v.
Plaza Health Laboratories,Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit found the
expression "point source" in the Clean Water Act to be unclear and invoked the rule of lenity.

Id. at 644-45.
308. 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971).

309. Id. at 565.
310. Id. at 559.
311. Id. at 564.65.
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The statute at issue in InternationalMinerals had the same
syntactic structure as the statutes inLiparotaand Ratzlaf.It stated
that whoever "knowingly violates any ... regulation" promulgated
under the underlying Interstate Commerce Act shall be fined or
imprisoned. 1 2 InternationalMinerals is now more than a quarter
of a century old and courts of appeals have followed its holding
regularly
with respect to the interpretation of the environmental
3 13
laws.
Commentators who support strong enforcement of the environmental laws have voiced concern that the Supreme Court will
ultimately apply the rule of lenity to reduce the laws' clout. 1' To
date, the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, and has
denied certiorari in a Ninth Circuit case that ruled in favor of the
government.3 1 If the Court does hear such a case, there is reason
to believe that it will continue in the path of the courts of appeals,
and refuse to apply lenity, notwithstanding Ratzlaf and Liparota.
This is not to say that hard cases will not test the applicability of
the public welfare offense doctrine. In Staples, the Supreme Court
held that the doctrine does not apply to the National Firearms Act,
which required the registration of machine guns.318 The Court
refused to liken firearms to poison, and held that the statute
required knowledge of the law as well as of the underlying facts.3 17
In Staples, however, the Court reaffirmed the applicability of the
doctrine to cases like InternationalMinerals, 8 adding another
312. Id. at 559 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 834(f)).
313. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84 (6th Cir.
1991); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990). But see United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc:, 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984).

314. See David E. Filippi, Note, Unleashingthe Rule of Lenity: EnvironmentalEnforcers
Beware, 26 ENVTL. L. 923 (1996); Patrick W. Ward, Comment, The CriminalProvisionsof the
Clean Water Act as Interpreted by the Judiciary and the Resulting Response from the
Legislature, 5 DICK J. ENVTL. L. & POLY. 399 (1996). For a related concern that courts will

begin interpreting the bankruptcy law with undue lenity, see Markell, supra note 217, at
336-37.
315. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993), amended,35 F.3d 1275 (9th

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995). Those circuits that have considered this issue
have ruled in this manner, both with respect to the Clean Water Act, and with respect to
other environmental crimes that criminalize knowing violations. See, e.g., United States v.
Buckley, 934 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1991) (construing the Clean Air Act and CERCLA).
316. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. at 600, 618-19 (1994).

317. Id. at 616.
318. Id. at 607.
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reason to expect the Court to continue to apply this doctrine in the
realm of environmental crimes, unless, of course, Congress changes
the law.319
Where does this leave us? Mens rea requirements in criminal
cases vary from requiring that a defendant was aware of the law
and knowingly violated it, to requiring that he knew his conduct to
be illegal in some way, to requiring that he knew that he was acting
wrongfully, to simply requiring, in the case of environmental
statutes, that he knew what he did. These differences, intended to
match statutory requirements with societal values, offer protection against prosecution for inadvertent violation of highly
technical statutes in some instances, such as tax laws, foodstamp regulations, copyright laws, and currency transactions. The
different mens rea requirements further serve to impose knowledge
of everyday norms in other instances, such as antitrust laws,
securities laws, and certain firearm laws, and to hold people
responsible for acquiring knowledge oftheir legal obligations in still
others, such as environmental laws. I have argued here that the
differences have an additional and important effect on the system
of criminal justice: The strength of the mens rea requirement
interacts with the institutional setting in which the statute is
enforced to serve as a control on statutory inflation.
The guesswork imposed on the courts to divine legislative intent
from statute to statute suggests that Congress does not do a very
good job in this area. In fact, in one case decided in the 1990s, the
Court had to rewrite a statute to rescue it from being held
unconstitutional because Congress failed to write the state of mind
requirement in a sufficiently clear manner. 20 In other cases
discussed earlier in this section, the Court likewise added state of
mind requirements to statutes that did not contain any at all.3 21 I

have argued that more is at stake than the doctrines suggest. The
319. I do not mean to imply that lenity should never apply to ambiguous or vague terms
in criminal prosecutions under the environmental statutes. See-United States v. Borowski,
977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying lenity to conclude that criminal provisions of the Clean
Water Act do not apply when defendants and employees are placed at risk prior to toxins
entering the public water supply).
320. United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 641 (1994) (inserting additional mens
rea requirement into Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18
U.S.C. § 2252).
321. Staples, 511 U.S. at 619; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
437-38 (1978).
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state of mind requirements affect not only who will be convicted
under the law as it is written, but also how the law develops in the
future. Congress should draft statutes with this understanding, and
draft them clearly enough to leave the courts with less uncertainty.
C. Writing Rules of Construction into the Statute Itself The
Wrong Path
The most straightforward approach to controlling statutory
inflation is for the legislature to write instructions into the statute.
As long as no constitutional problems arise, 22 the decision of how
much inflation should exist will become more a legislative decision,
and less a by-product of institutional choices. We have just seen
how regulating the state of mind requirements of dual-remedy
statutes can affect the subsequent interpretive history. One might
hypothesize that statutory statements regarding the legislature's
interpretive philosophy might be more direct and at least as
effective.
In fact, Congress commonly writes interpretive instructions into
criminal statutes. For example, a federal statute that makes it
illegal to import certain injurious animals into the United States
contains this instruction:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal or modify
any provision of the Public Health Service Act or Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Also, this section shall not authorize
any action with respect to the importation of any plant pest
as defined in the Federal Plant Pest Act, insofar as such
importation is subject to regulation under that Act."
Similarly, the statute that outlaws counterfeiting outside the
United States contains the following provision: "No provision of this
section shall be construed as authorizing any entity to conduct
investigations of counterfeit United States currency.""' And the
federal bribery statute, which outlaws bribing witnesses as well as
322. See Rosenkranz, supra note 268, for a discussion of constitutional limits of
legislatively-imposed rules of construction. Rosenkranz argues persuasively that Congress
does not regularly use this device to the extent permissible under the Constitution.
323. 18 U.S.C. § 42(aXl) (2000).
324. Id. § 470.
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government officials, instructs interpreters not to construe as
bribery the payment of a statutory witness fee or reasonable travel
expenses. 25 There are many other examples.
Despite the availability of this limiting device, it does not seem
to be a particularly useful means of controlling statutory inflation.
All three examples referred to in the previous paragraph instruct
interpreters with respect to a particular potential misconception
about legislative intent that the language of the statute may have
left open. In contrast, statutory inflation occurs opportunistically,
generally as the result of dogged efforts by agencies and prosecutors
over time, often in response to changing patterns of conduct by
those whose conduct the statute was enacted to regulate. Thus, only
a general instruction concerning the interpretation of the statute as
a whole will likely have an effect on subsequent inflation, apart
from particular interpretive pitfalls that can be identified in
advance. Such an instruction is unlikely to do its intended job well,
however, because it is not possible to write such an instruction so
that it affects all and only the set of potentially inflationary cases
without having unwanted effects on other cases.
Consider a situation in which Congress considers the matter in
advance, and would like the courts to adopt the standard model
of interpretation: liberal construction in civil cases, narrow
construction in criminal cases. As we have seen, courts rarely
impose dual interpretations on the same statutory language, and it
would probably be unmanageable to expect them to begin doing so
as a matter of law. 2 ' The standard model arises largely from prosecutorial discretion. When only the most egregious violations of a
statute or regulation become the subject ofcriminal prosecution, the
system works as though it had adopted the standard model of
interpretation. Inflation often occurs when broad interpretations
in civil cases sufficiently alter behavioral norms so that broad
interpretation in criminal cases appears natural to the interpreter.
If that is what is happening, however, there seems to be little
Congress can do to impose the standard model in other situations,
short of eliminating the institutional settings that lead to statutory inflation as a by-product. To eliminate such institutionsprincipally administrative agencies-would be to throw the baby
325. Id. § 201(d).
326. See Sachs, supra note 28, for a discussion of the benefits of a single interpretation.
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out with the bath water if there are independent reasons for
maintaining them, which there surely must be.
To see how poorly legislative instructions can work in this
context, let us return to RICO. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
Inc.,327 the Supreme Court rejected a civil defendant's request that
lenity be applied to interpret the statute narrowly in a civil case
32
because of the existence of criminal liability under the statute. 8
RICO contains a statement that the statute is to be liberally
construed." 9 The Court noted: "Indeed, if Congress' liberal-construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964, where
RICO's remedial purposes are most evident."330
Acknowledging that the rule of lenity might act to limit the scope
of criminal prosecutions under RICO, the Court refused to construe
narrowly § 1964(c)'s requirements for bringing civil actions which,
like the antitrust laws, permit treble damages plus attorneys'
fees. 31 Thus, the Court interpreted the liberal construction
provision of RICO at most to call for the standard model of
interpretation-a model for which the provision was not needed,
because courts tend to employ this model anyway.
Since Sedima, the Supreme Court has noted RICO's liberal
construction provision on a number of occasions, often finding it
inapplicable. For example, in Rotella v. Wood,3 82 the Court refused
to expand the statute of limitations for bringing civil RICO cases
through a discovery rule that would toll the statute until it would
have been reasonable for the plaintiff to discover that a pattern of
racketeering activity had occurred. 3 ' Citing Sedima, the Court
stated: "This objective of encouraging prompt litigation to combat
racketeering is the most obvious answer to Rotella's argument that
the injury and pattern discovery rule should be adopted because
327. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
328. Id. at 491 n.10.
329. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
330. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491, n.10.

331. The Court ultimately decided that there was no interpretive problem, because the
language of RICO is so clear that no substantive rules of construction are needed in any
event. Id. at 497-98. The dissent agreed that the language was plain, but decided that it
meant the opposite of what the majority thought it meant. Id. at 501 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). For criticism of the reasoning presented by both sides, see Solan, supra note 66,
at 99-104.
332. 528 U.S. 549 (2000).

333. Id. at 558-59.
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'RICO is to be read broadly' and 'liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes.'" 34
Likewise, in Reves v. Ernst & Young,335 the Court found RICO's
liberal construction provision insufficient to justify an expansion of
RICO liability to include auditors:
This clause obviously seeks to ensure that Congress' intent is
not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the statute, but it
is not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that
Congress never intended. Nor does the clause help us to
determine what purposes Congress had in mind. Those must be
gleaned from the statute through the normal means of
interpretation. The clause "only serves as an aid for resolving an
ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one."" 6
And in Holmes v. SecuritiesInvestor ProtectionCorp.,33 the Court
held that only those directly injured by a pattern of racketeering
activity are proper RICO plaintiffs, notwithstanding the liberal
construction clause. 8
This does not mean that the Supreme Court has not interpreted
RICO broadly in a number of cases.3 39 Nonetheless, this brief survey
suggests that the liberal construction provision in RICO has not
served its purpose. Early in the statute's history, the Court issued
several opinions that required the lower courts to follow the
statute's broad language even if that language led to RICO
litigation far beyond the sphere of organized crime, which RICO
was initially intended to combat.340 In one of these earlier cases,
United States v. Turkette, 4 ' the Court, interpreting the word
"enterprise" broadly, took pains to make it clear that it would
have done the same if the liberal construction provision had
334. Id. at 557-58 n.3 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98).
335. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
336. Id. at 183-84 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 n.10).
337. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
338. Id. at 268-70.
339. See supra Part I.D.
340. See Bryan T. Camp, Dual Construction of RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 61 (1994); David Kurzweil, Criminal and Civil RICO: Traditional
Canons of Statutory Interpretationand the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 41 (1996).
341. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
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not existed.34 2 In another, Russello v. United States, 43 the Court
actually made reference to the liberal construction provision in
construing RICO's forfeiture provision broadly.34 4 Since then, the
Court has been rather stingy with civil RICO plaintiffs, sometimes
even more so than with the government. 3" This history is both
dynamic and very complicated. It does not lend support to the
proposition that the legislature can decide in advance how to deal
with statutory inflation by inserting general rules of construction
into a statute.
D. Modifying the Chevron Doctrine in Criminal Cases
Let us return to O'Hagan.46 In a single opinion, the Supreme
Court upheld Rule 14e-3, the validity of which was controversial at
the time, and held O'Hagan criminally liable for having willfully
violated it.3 47 As discussed above, part of the rationale for upholding
the regulation was the Chevron doctrine. Chevron has generated a
great deal of controversy, and it is not my intention here to discuss
its general merits. 48 Rather, O'Haganraises a somewhat narrower,
but nonetheless important issue: Should courts defer to agency
interpretations of statutes in holding defendants criminally liable?
In O'Hagan,the Supreme Court did not address the question headon, but its holding was consistent with an affirmative answer.
Whether deference to agencies in these circumstances is appropriate depends upon two considerations-legislative intent and due
process. As for legislative intent, criminal liability for violation of
either the Exchange Act itself or the SEC's rules promulgated
342. Id. at 587.
343. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).

344. Id. at 27.
345. See supraPart I.D.1.
346. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); see supra notes 151-79 and
accompanying text.
347. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 676-78.
348. The literature on the Chevron doctrine is enormous. For a few interesting examples,
see Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Futureofthe Chevron Doctrine,72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351 (1994); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: JudicialReview of Agency
Interpretationsof StatutoryProvisions,41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Sunstein, supranote 24.
For an interesting article that argues that Chevron deference should be limited to situations
in which the agency interpretation has the force of law, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). Much of the major literature on the
doctrine is cited in this article as well.
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thereunder has been part of the Securities Exchange Act since its
enactment in 1934.""9 It is beyond controversy that Congress
intended to permit the SEC to write rules, which if disobeyed, could
lead to criminal sanctions. There is no evidence, however, that
Congress contemplated that the SEC would exercise its rulemaking
authority to define crimes beyond those that Congress was willing
to legislate, later relying on courts applying the Chevron doctrine
for judicial approval of its expansion of the criminal law. Without
evidence that Congress intended to delegate to agencies the
sweeping power to define crimes at the margins of the statute,
lenity, at least to some extent, should play a role in judicial interpretation.
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the Court's perspective in
O'Haganwith the principles of fair play that underlie the rule of
lenity generally. Most examples of statutory inflation result from
the subsequent criminalization of norms that had been longestablished in civil contexts. The history of liability for insider
trading350 and the criminalization of extraterritorial violations of
the antitrust laws35 ' illustrate this process. In reality, these

cases do not present serious problems of notice, since, within the
relevant interpretive community, 352 the conduct being charged as a
349. The Act states in relevant part:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than

section 78dd-1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation
of which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the
terms of this chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or

causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or document
required to be filed under this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or
any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in

subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or by any self-regulatory organization
in connection with an application for membership or participation therein or to
become associated with a member thereof, which statement was false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $1,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, except

that when such person is a person other than a natural person, a fine not
exceeding $2,500,000 may be imposed; but no person shall be subject to
imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he
proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 78fl(a) (2000). This section became effective July 1, 1934, as provided by Act of
June 6, 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, § 34, 48 Stat. 905 (1934).

350. See supra Part I.B.1.
351. See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
352. For discussion of interpretive communities

and their relevance

to legal
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crime had clearly been unacceptable for some time prior to the
prosecution. But that is not what happened in O'Hagan, where
aggressive rulemaking and the Chevron doctrine combined to create
a new crime. Whether one is concerned with fair notice or with
separation of powers, O'Haganseems to give too much deference to
agency interpretation.
A number of writers have noticed this problem, but there is no
consensus in the literature about how to deal with it. Cass Sunstein
has suggested that agencies should receive Chevron deference only
when the legislature has spoken clearly."' 3 Mark Alexander argues
that there should be no Chevron deference at all when it comes to
administrative crimes, largely because of separation of powers
concerns.3 54 Sanford Greenberg defends the Chevron doctrine in the
case of administrative crimes, arguing, among other things, that the
notice problems are not serious, especially since defendants have
notice of the regulation itself, and that congressional delegation to
agencies is a mature doctrine in American jurisprudence.3 5
Although I prefer Sunstein's proposal to the others, some
modification is needed. Consider the following three scenarios:
(1) An agency makes a rule that is of questionable validity in
order to cooperate with the Department of Justice in forming
the basis of criminal prosecution for willful violations of a
regulation. The Department of Justice promptly brings a series
of prosecutions, and the validity of the regulation makes its
way through the courts in that context.
(2) An agency makes a rule that only questionably applies to
a particular species of conduct. Before any prosecutions are
brought, however, the agency itself brings a series of civil
enforcement actions under the new rule. The United States
courts of appeals review agency rulings, and find the
regulation valid in that context. Thereafter, the Department of
Justice brings a series of prosecutions.35 6
interpretation, see DENNIS PATrERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 76-127 (1996); William S. Blatt,
InterpretiveCommunities: The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation,95 Nw. U. L.
REv. 629(2001).
353. Sunstein, supra note 24, at 2115-16.
354. Alexander, supra note 24, at 613.

355. Greenberg, supra note 24, at 4, 17-18.
356. In a related version of this scenario, the validity of a questionable regulation remains
untested in any context until the first criminal case is brought.
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(3) An agency makes a rule that is clearly within the scope of
its authority as set forth in the relevant statute. The
Department of Justice promptly brings a series of prosecutions
for willful violation of the regulation, and the validity of the
regulation makes its way through the courts in that context.
The first scenario describes O'Hagan.The second resembles the
state of insider trading law at the time of Chiarella.The courts by
that time had clearly held the conduct described in Chiarellato be
a violation of Rule 10b-5 in civil cases, although it would not be
accurate to say that Congress had spoken clearly on the matter in
§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act. The third scenario describes a
valid exercise of agency authority regardless of the standard of
review.
How can one uphold the prosecutions in the last two scenarios
but strike down the prosecution in the first? Sunstein's model
comes close, but relies exclusively on Congress to make the clear
statement. I suggest that if a court with jurisdiction over the
defendant has already spoken on the matter in civil cases--even if
it relied upon the Chevron doctrine to do so-the prosecution should
be upheld. Thus, I would add to Sunstein's proposal that a clear
statement of the regulation's validity from any legal authority with
jurisdiction over the defendant should be sufficient to permit
subsequent inflationary decisions. 5 7 This will allow the criminal
law to evolve, but only after the relevant interpretive community
has absorbed the norms sufficiently to be on notice. One may argue
that this proposal does not adequately take into account concerns
about the separation of powers, but Congress did enact the enabling
statute, and Congress does retain the right to override any
regulation it believes to be too aggressive.
The Supreme Court, has, in fact, employed a similar standard in
other contexts. In United States v. Lanier,35 8 the defendant was a
trial court judge in Tennessee who was accused of sexually assaulting a number of women who had judicial business before
him.3 59 He was charged with violating § 242 of the federal Criminal
Code, which makes it a crime to act "willfully" and under color of
357. The differences between my position and Sunstein's may be more a difference of focus
than of substance since he does not address these options.
358. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
359. Id. at 261.
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law to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.3 60 The question raised in Lanierwas the
standard for determining whether the defendant had violated the
constitutional rights of the women he assaulted. 6 ' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that only a
decision of the Supreme Court finding a constitutional right in "a
factual situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar" 6 2 would
suffice. Applying this standard, the appellate court reversed
Lanier's conviction. 3
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated the conviction.36 4 Justice Souter wrote:
There are three related manifestations of the fair warning
requirement. First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of

"a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in

terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."
Second, as a sort of "junior version of the vagueness doctrine,"
the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of
lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a
criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered.
Third, although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by
judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, due process
bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal
statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial
decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope .... 365
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held that opinions by
the court of appeals with jurisdiction over the defendant are an
adequate source of fair notice to any public official accused of
criminally violating the constitutional rights of another.6 To the
extent that the circuits are divided on a particular issue, that fact
should also be taken into account in determining whether notice

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996)).
See id.at 263.
Id. (quoting Lanier v. United States, 73 F.3d 1380, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Lanier v. United States 73 F.3d 1380, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996).
See Lanier,520 U.S. at 272.
Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
Id. at 269.
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is sufficient. 6 7 Relying on authority that deals with qualified
immunity in civil cases, the Court held that criminal liability under
§ 242 should attach only if "[t]he contours of the right [violated are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right."3 68
A similar standard should be applied to judicial deference to
administrative agencies when a defendant is charged with
administrative crimes. Whether from the statute itself or from prior
judicial decisions, it must be "sufficiently clear" that a reasonable
person would understand the regulation in question to be a valid
exercise of the agency's rulemaking authority before criminal
liability may attach. A recent article by Merrill and Hickman
suggests that as a descriptive matter the Supreme Court has
applied the Chevron doctrine unevenly in a systematic way.369 They
rely heavily on Christensen v. HarrisCounty,"' a case in which the
Court refused to give deference to the Department of Labor's
interpretation of a statute contained in an agency opinion letter
that did not carry the force of law. Instead, the Court applied the
older, multi-factored standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 7 ' to
determine how much deference should be given. Obviously, the
questioned regulations in O'Hagan and other cases do carry the
force of law. However, cases like Christensen demonstrate that,
even within current legal doctrine, it is possible to carve out areas
in which courts consider a broader range of factors. One of those
factors should be whether the boundaries of the law were sufficiently clear before a person was convicted of committing an
administrative crime.

III. CONCLUSION: STATUTORY INFLATION AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHOICE

Although most of the cases discussed in this Article deal with
doctrines governing how broadly or narrowly to interpret a statute,
I have argued that which of these principles a court invokes
depends in large part on the institutions that are entrusted with
367. Id.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id. at 270 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 348.
529 U.S. 576 (2000).
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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enforcing the statute. My argument is not that this dynamic always
occurs, or that it is entirely predictive. Counterexamples and gaps
surely exist. Nonetheless, the trend is sufficiently robust to merit
attention. This concluding section will focus on the institutions that
are involved in the interpretive process, using the recently enacted
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002372 as an illustration.
Thus far, we have not discussed the defendants. Putting RICO to
one side, virtually all of the statutes discussed above can be seen as
regulating conduct within the marketplace. The securities and
antitrust laws do so overtly. Others, like the Clean Water Act and
the Copyright Act, can be seen as preventing individuals from
gaining an unfair advantage in the market at the expense of others.
The Bankruptcy Code may be viewed in terms of market failure
as well. This approach to legal problems, a centerpiece of the law
and economics movement, provides a means for characterizing
regulatory legislation. Thus, many of the cases discussed above
involve individuals who were accused of failing to conduct their
business affairs according to the rules of the market. The market
itself, then, is clearly an institution that participates in the dynamic
discussed throughout this Article.
The three branches of government are also players. How broadly
a regulatory statute is likely to be interpreted depends largely,
of course, on the language of the statute. But it also depends in
part upon how aggressively its enforcers advocate for expansive
interpretations in court. Broad interpretation of criminal statutes
is least likely to occur when there is no agency attempting to
convince courts to expand the law's reach in the civil context and
prosecutors do not give top priority to the criminal cases that do
arise. Prosecutorial discretion based on limited resources leads
373
prosecutors to bring fewer-and only the most egregious-cases.
The institutional setting not only affects rights by virtue of the
substance of the law itself and any regulation that agencies
promulgate under delegated authority, but it also affects rights by
influencing the ways in which interpreters are likely to resolve
disputes about the law's scope. Neil Komesar has put it succinctly:
"[Vlariation in institutional choice dictates variation in law and

372. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
373. See supra text following note 104.
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rights.""" Komesar illustrates his point with a host of examples
from the law of property. For example, in the much-studied case,
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,3" 5 seven neighbors sued a cement
company for creating a nuisance. Atlantic had quietly acquired land
in upstate New York for its plant, and once it opened, the dust and
debris made life very difficult for those who lived nearby.37 6 The
ordinary remedy for nuisance is an injunction, but the court decided
to award damages instead. The plant had cost some $45 million to
build, and the neighbors' economic losses were rather small."' Had
an injunction issued, Atlantic could have paid to have it dissolved,
at least in principle. But the presence of as many as seven plaintiffs
increased the likelihood of holdouts or unreasonable bargainers,
so the trial court decided to balance the equities and to award
the plaintiffs the diminution in the value of their property. 8 ' On
appeal, the case was remanded, not for an injunction, but for a
reassessment of damages.37 9 In response to the dissent's suggestion
that an injunction was necessary not only to protect the property
and health of the plaintiffs, but of others in the Hudson Valley,38
the majority argued that that problem is for the legislature to
address.3 8 ' Thus, the majority's conclusion is based not only on a
balancing of costs and benefits of the parties, but a balancing of
abilities and liabilities of various institutions: the market, the
courts, and the legislature.
As Komesar points out, the court's conclusion that the market
was not competent to set the value of the loss by allowing postinjunction bargaining, and that the court was not competent to
make legislative choices, was devastating to the plaintiffs, who
stood to gain much more by an injunction. Thus, the decision as to
who should make the decision-the courts, the legislature, or the

374. KOMESAR, supra note 26, at 20.

375. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
376. Id. at 876 n.5 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
377. Id. at 873.
378. Id. at 875.
379. Id.; see Daniel A. Farber, ParadiseLost/PragmatismRegained. The Ironic History
of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397 (1997) (analyzing the Coase Theorem through a
hypothetical case based on Boomer).
380. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 875-76 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
381. Id. at 871.
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market-not only affected the legal process,
it also affected the
38 2
property rights of the plaintiff neighbors.
As remote as bankruptcy is from Boomer,my principal argument
in this Article is very much like Komesar's. Consider the SarbanesOxley Act, enacted in response to the Enron and Worldcom
scandals, among others. 8 3 With little dissent, both houses of
Congress voted to give the SEC broad new powers concerning the
regulation of accountants, 3 4 to impose new disclosure requirements
on companies, to require chief executive officers to certify annual
and quarterly reports, 8 6 and to enhance criminal penalties for
securities law violations. 8 7 In addition, the statute provides more
than $100 million to the SEC as additional enforcement
resources. 3 1 In July 2002, the month the Act was signed into law,
President Bush announced an increase of some $120 million for the
SEC's enforcement budget.3 8 9
These are precisely the circumstances that lead to statutory
inflation: an evil that appears in need of remedy, new legislation to
combat that evil, agencies charged with vigorous enforcement, and
the government's financial commitment to enforcement. Moreover,
enhanced criminal penalties make prosecutions a matter of higher
priority for Justice Department attorneys. If these enforcement
resources continue to be allocated over time, one might expect
this statute to lead to broad construction of the securities laws
generally, whatever the merits of the statute's substantive
provisions as a means of fighting securities fraud and related
misconduct.
This is not to say that any inflationary effects of the statute are
likely to occur soon. To the contrary, an interesting intergovernmental dynamic began on July 30, 2002, the day that President
Bush signed the law. At the White House ceremony, the President
said: "This new law sends very clear messages that all concerned
must heed. This law says to every dishonest corporate leader: 'You
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

KOMESAR, supra note 26, at 12-16.
107 Pub. L. No. 204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
Id. §§ 101-208.
Id. §§ 401-409.
Id. § 302.
Title IX of the Act is entitled, "White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of

2002." Id. §§ 901-905.
388. Id. § 601.
389. Bob Kemper, Bush Lectures Big Business, Cin. TRIB., July 10, 2002, at 1.
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will be exposed and punished; the era of low standards and false
profits is over. No boardroom in America is above or beyond the
law.'"3 9 0 Later that day, however, the White House released a
"Statement by the President," containing a narrow interpretation
of the whistleblower protection provisions of the statute.3 9 1 Section
806 of the Act offers protection to employees of public companies
who provide information of wrongdoing to various authorities. 92 As
for the entities to which such information may be provided, the
statute is inartfully worded. It states in part that no action may be
taken against an employee because of any act done by the employee:
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct
which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation
of [various laws], when the information or assistance is
provided to or the investigation is conducted by...
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress;
393

The statute empowers the Department of Labor to enforce this
provision,"9 ' which means that the Department's interpretation of
the statute will be given deference under the Chevron doctrine. The
Statement by the President says in relevant part:
Given that the legislative purpose of [the whistleblowing
provision] is to protect against company retaliation for lawful
cooperation with investigations and not to define the scope of
investigative authority or to grant new investigative authority,
the executive branch shall construe section [8061 as referring to
investigations authorized by the rules of the Senate or the
House of Representatives and conducted for a proper legislative
purpose.3 95

This seems to mean that the administration had determined not to
bring an enforcement action against a corporation that fires an
390. Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC.
1283, 1284 (July 30, 2002).
391. Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1288 (July 30, 2002).
392. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a).
393. Id.

394. Id. § 806(b).
395. Statement on the Signing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 391, at 1286.
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employee for telling a member of Congress about corporate wrongdoing unless the member is participating in an investigation,
commenced under the rules of the House in which she sits.
The President's interpretation of the statute was so narrow that
it probably would not survive even the minimum scrutiny under
Chevron. 9 ' The statute provides that no action may be taken
against an employee for assisting in an investigation "when the
assistance is provided to, or the investigation is conducted by any
Senators Grassley and Leahy, who wrote
member of Congress ....
the provision, criticized the administration's statement as a flawed
reading of the law that "risks chilling corporate whistleblowers who
wish to report securities fraud.""'8 Eventually, the Department of
Labor abandoned the position that the President had espoused,
increasing the likelihood of litigation under the statute, and thereby
the possibility of subsequent statutory inflation. 3 " Such policies, if
actually implemented, would impact the types of fraud subject to
scrutiny under the law, which should blunt inflation, at least in the
near term.
As for the statute itself, it also contains some anti-inflationary
provisions. For example, § 405 exempts from Title IVs enhanced
financial disclosure requirements any investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act. °° This provision is
typical of the anti-inflationary provisions discussed earlier in this
Article," 1 and should not have a global effect on the interpretation
of the securities laws generally.
Probably more important is the statute's interpretive statement
that nothing in the Act should be construed to limit the authority
of the SEC to regulate the accounting profession.0 2 This provision,
in effect, deprives future litigants of using canons such as ex."9

396. This is not to say that the statement on its own is entitled to Chevron deference
without formal adoption by the Department of Labor. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note
348.
397. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (emphasis added).
398. See Holly Rosenkrantz, SenatorsCallfor More Support for CorporateWhistleblowers,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 31, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bloomberg-All

Bloomberg News.
399. Christopher Lee, LaborDept.Shifts Whistle-Blower View, WASH. POST, Jan. 28,2003,

at A19.
400. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 405.
401. See supra Part II.B, II.C.
402. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 3(c).
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pression unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another) to argue that the absence of a particular
stricture in such a broad statute should imply Congress' intent to
exclude an area from regulation. 4 ' As such, it may well encourage
inflation as rulings in civil cases, perhaps under the Chevron
doctrine, begin to influence the statute's interpretation in criminal
cases. Similarly, the provision requiring chief executive officers to
certify SEC filings "based on the officer's knowledge" 4 4 is likely to
result in disputes over the precise interpretation of the statute's
state of mind requirements. Institutional conduct over time may
play some role in how these issues are ultimately resolved. The
courts ultimately will determine whether an individual should
be held civilly or criminally liable for violating this Act and the
statutes that it amends.
When appellate courts start issuing their opinions, there will be
little or no mention of the institutional dynamics that have colored
their perspectives. As the law develops, and the scope of the statute
becomes better defined, the institutional choices that led to these
outcomes will also be deeply embedded in the background. Perhaps
the decisions will generally be supportable. Yet, as I hope to have
shown in this Article, it would do the system well to legislate,
regulate, and adjudicate with the predictable consequences of these
governmental actions more openly discussed in advance of their
implementation.

403. See Rosenkranz, supra note 268 for discussion of Congress' power to eliminate such
canons in a particular statute. This Act has done so indirectly with respect to a portion of its
substance.
404. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(2).

